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The Power of Distant Rewards: Driving
International Innovation Through
United States Patent Incentives
Richard S. Gruner*
Technological innovation outside the United States is increasing. The United States remains the largest single source of new
inventions, but the rest of the world produces most technological
advances. Yet, even as innovation capacity outside the United
States grows, the production of advances remains underincentivized in many developed and developing countries. Weak
incentives apply to the outlier advances that are the province of
patent laws. These outlier advances—typically reflecting material
departures from prior technical knowledge and potentially establishing fundamentally new lines of technological development and
consumer products—are particularly important components of
technological development. By shortchanging incentives for outlier
advances, society hinders the pace and scope of technological advancement.
Talented innovators located outside the United States too often
look to home country patent laws for invention rewards and incentives. This results in weak incentives and undesirably low levels of
technological innovation regarding the types of outlier advances
addressed by patents. This article explains the inadequacy of many
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home country patent laws to incentivize innovation by inventors
working outside the United States. It argues that inventors across
the world should look to United States patent laws for their primary invention rewards. Such a strategy will not only spur additional
funding and institutional backing for research worldwide, but will
increase the likelihood that more outlier technologies will be created to the benefit of parties in the United States and throughout
the world.
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INTRODUCTION
United States patent laws and associated rewards have the potential to incentivize innovation not just in this country but around
the world. Innovators presently produce technological advances in
diverse countries.1 Yet, the patent incentives in innovators’ home
countries may only provide weak incentives to produce socially
valuable innovations. Local laws may be poorly understood or fail
to apply to important categories of advances (such as inventions
turning on computer programming).2 Even patent laws that are superficially strong on their face (in that they are comprehensive and
well-understood) may provide weak rewards due to poor enforcement.3 And, even where strongly enforced, patent laws applying
only to relatively small economies may produce small economic
rewards, since patent rights to control the manufacture, use, and
sale of patented items in those small economies will be sources of
only minimal payments and rewards.4
Fortunately, United States patent laws and the United States’
enormous economy can incentivize (and potentially subsidize) innovation across the world. Rewards from United States patent laws
1

International patterns of research are discussed infra Section II.
For an overview of the significant differences in patent protections for computerbased advances across countries, see Ania Jedrusik and Phil Wadsworth, Patent
Protection
for
Software-Implemented
Inventions,
WIPO
(Feb.
2017),
www.wipo.int/wipo_magazine/en/2017/01/article_0002.html
[https://perma.cc/Q32S5C7Y].
3
Differences in patent law enforcement across countries are discussed infra Section
II.C.
4
The impacts of local economy size on patent-influenced incentives for innovation
are discussed infra Section II.A.
2
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can substitute for the weak incentives that would prevail if only
home country laws applied. Under United States laws, inventors
working in most foreign countries are treated equally to inventors
in the United States, meaning that innovators in even the smallest
countries can look to patent-influenced rewards in the United
States for innovation incentives and compensation for successful
innovation efforts.5 The size of these patent-influenced rewards in
the United States economy can, if properly pursued and managed,
provide the primary inducements to innovation across the world
and drive international innovation.
In effect, the United States invites and pays for useful innovations from worldwide sources. This “foreign aid” through the patent system does not require government intervention; rather, it occurs through private commercial processes, as mediated by United
States patent rights.
This article describes why innovators throughout the world—
and particularly in developing countries—should look to United
States patents as their primary source of incentives and compensation. With an appropriate patenting strategy in the United States,
innovators in the smallest countries can operate on the same plane
as their counterparts in the United States. Fund raising and innovation planning that count on this source of rewards may promote
innovation efforts in foreign settings far beyond the capabilities of
local resources to justify and support technological research.
This article emphasizes the features of United States patent
laws (relative to patent laws in many foreign countries) that should
make United States patent laws and technological needs among the
first considerations for foreign innovators in targeting innovation
efforts and in allocating resources to those efforts. The article goes
on to consider some of the strengths and weaknesses of such an
innovation strategy. Overall, the use of United States patent laws
and rewards to drive innovation in accordance with the methods
described here can both generate more innovations worldwide and

5

The means by which to implement this patenting strategy and increase innovation
incentives in both large and small countries are discussed infra Section III.
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support profitable innovation efforts in diverse international settings.6
I. INDICATORS OF ROBUST INNOVATION CAPACITY OUTSIDE THE
UNITED STATES
A number of international indicators of innovation activities
and related resources confirm that robust technological development processes are at work outside the United States. As described
in this section, foreign innovation is benefitting from growing research and development (R&D) spending and increasing science
and engineering expertise. This subsection reviews evidence of the
strength and continuing growth in current technological innovation
capacity outside the United States.
A. International R&D Expenditures
R&D spending is a global force supporting technological innovation.7 Only a relatively small fraction of recent R&D spending
worldwide occurred in the United States. While R&D spending in
this country (approximately 26% of the global total of $1.918 trillion in 2015) leads the world, the remaining 74% of R&D spending
supports innovation in diverse other countries.8 According to the
National Science Board, the top fifteen countries in R&D spending
are9:

6

Profiles of research efforts in several countries that appear to already benefit from
subsidies based on United States patents are contained infra Section IV(C).
7
See generally NATIONAL SCIENCE BOARD, SCIENCE & ENGINEERING INDICATORS
(2018),
https://www.nsf.gov/statistics/2018/nsb20181/assets/nsb20181.pdf
[https://
perma.cc/UG8W-45XE]. All of the R&D spending amounts included here reflect
estimates in current purchasing power parity (PPP) United States dollars. The gross
domestic product (GDP) figures used to compute the R&D spending to GDP ratios were
also measured in PPP United States dollars. See id. at ch. 4, at 35–37, tbl.4–5.
8
Id. at ch. 4, at 34–41.
9
Id. at ch. 4, at 37–40, tbl.4–5.
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FIGURE 1
Top Countries R&D Spending 2015

Country

Amount Percent
(Billion $) of Total

Percent
of GDP

United States
China
Japan
Germany
South Korea
France
India
United Kingdom
Brazil
Russia
Taiwan
Italy
Canada
Australia
Spain

497
409
170
115
74
61
50
46
38
38
34
30
27
23
20

26%
21%
9%
6%
4%
3%
3%
2%
2%
2%
2%
2%
1%
1%
1%

2.74
2.07
3.29
2.93
4.23
2.22
0.63
1.7
1.17
1.1
3.05
1.33
1.71
2.11
1.22

Total Top 15
All Others

1631
287

85%
15%

NA
NA

While R&D spending obviously varies greatly across the countries shown, at least three R&D spending patterns seem clear. First,
a middle range of primary innovation producers spend remarkably
similar amounts on R&D, taking into account differences in country economies. This similarity is apparent from the values above
for R&D spending as a percent of country GDP. Focusing on the
percentage values in Figure 1 and taking the United States as a
“typical” benchmark for R&D spending at 2.74% of GDP, countries as dissimilar in location and background as Taiwan (3.05),
Germany (2.93), France (2.22), Australia (2.11), and China (2.07)
support roughly similar levels of R&D spending to the United
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States. The differences in the absolute amounts of R&D spending
across these countries may be artifacts reflecting the very large differences in their economy sizes.
However, two high and low variations from these countries’
spending patterns are also apparent. Taking into account their
economy sizes, a few countries have markedly high R&D spending. Focusing once again on the percentage of GDP figures, South
Korea (4.23) and Japan (3.29) spend more on R&D than the United
States, adjusting for the sizes of their economies. The levels of research spending in these countries is higher than their GDP size
would suggest, using the experience of the United States as a predictor. Businesses and other parties in these countries apparently
emphasized R&D projects over other commercial enterprises to a
greater degree than in the United States. Researchers in these countries may also be relying on significant sources of research support
from outside of their own economies that are not constrained by
their own economy sizes. These countries may be early pioneers in
the type of international subsidization of home country innovation
advocated in this article and explained in more detail in the last
section of this text.10
Finally, several of the top fifteen R&D spenders seem to lag
behind spending levels found in the United States and the comparable countries mentioned above. In particular, adjusting for differences in their respective economy sizes, the percentage of GDP
figures shown in Figure 1 indicate that India (0.63), Russia (1.1),
Brazil (1.17), Spain (1.22), Italy (1.33), the United Kingdom (1.7),
and Canada (1.71) have markedly lower R&D spending levels than
the United States. This means that businesses and innovation
sources in these countries appear to be underemphasizing R&D, at
least in comparison to their counterparts in the United States.
Businesses and other innovation sources, such as major universities, in these countries may be the primary beneficiaries of changes
to embrace the innovation subsidization strategies advocated here,
using the additional subsidies from this strategy to bring their R&D
spending to the level of the United States and beyond.
10

For a discussion of this strategy and the track records of a few countries that appear
to be implementing it, see infra Section IV.

2019]

THE POWER OF DISTANT REWARDS

869

The patterns of R&D spending reflected in Figure 1 appear to
be changing significantly in a few countries. China and South Korea are spending growing amounts on R&D, as spending in other
countries stays relatively stable. This combination of selective
growth and general stability is reflected in the following figure
tracking changes in R&D spending over time11:
FIGURE 2
CHANGES IN R&D SPENDING: 1981 – 2015

11

6.

Originally published in NATIONAL SCIENCE BOARD, supra note 7, ch. 4 at 42, fig.4–
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Two features of the R&D spending changes in this figure stand
out. First, in contrast to relatively similar levels of R&D spending
from 1981 to 1995 (as measured from R&D spending as a percentage of GDP), after 1995 several countries diverged in their R&D
spending. Japan moved to substantially higher R&D spending,
while the United States and Germany increased spending modestly. R&D spending in France remained about the same, and similar
spending in the United Kingdom decreased. The result is growing
gaps between the spending levels of these countries.
More strikingly, R&D spending in China and South Korea has
increased substantially since about 1998. In 1998, South Korean
R&D spending corresponded to 2.16% of GDP (roughly equal to
the level of the United States for 1998 of 2.49), but shot up to
4.23% of GDP by 2015. This reflects nearly doubling of R&D
spending by South Korea, as measured in relation to its GDP.
The changes in Chinese R&D spending are even more important given the enormous size of that country’s economy and
GDP. From 1998, when R&D spending was only .65% of China’s
GDP, to 2015, when spending amounted to 2.07% of its GDP,
spending on R&D in China rose to match the average for the European Union as a whole (1.96). This reflects a more than threefold
increase in Chinese R&D spending over 1998 levels. Assuming
United States R&D spending stays at about 2015 levels over time
(2.74)12 and Chinese spending continues to grow at the same rate
as it increased between 1998 and 2015, Chinese R&D spending
will exceed that of the United States in about 2019.13
B. International PhD Recipients in Science and Engineering
Fields
The worldwide distribution of scientific and engineering expertise provides another perspective for estimating international inno12

As shown in Figure 2 above, this spending level has not changed greatly since 2009
when it was 2.80.
13
The gap between United States and Chinese spending levels in 2015 on a percentage
of GDP basis was 2.74 - 2.07 = .67. The per year change in Chinese spending levels over
the 17 years between 1998 and 2015 was approximately .187 per year. At this same rate
of change, it will take about 3.6 years for Chinese spending to catch up with that of the
United States. See supra Figure 2.
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vation capacity. The home countries of recent doctoral degree recipients in science and engineering fields are settings where the
latest technical expertise will be available. Distributions of doctoral degree recipients help us predict the locations of the next wave
of technology pioneers.14 The following figure summarizes the
global distribution of new PhD graduates in science and engineering fields in 2014 (the countries are listed in descending order of
their R&D spending, as reflected in Figure 1)15:
FIGURE 3
Top Countries S&E PhD Graduates 2014
PhDs
(1000s)

Percent
of PhDs

United States
China
Japan
Germany
South Korea
France
India
United Kingdom
Brazil
Russia (2013)
Taiwan
Italy
Canada
Australia
Spain

40
34
7
15
6
10
13
14
9
19
2
6
5
5
7

17%
15%
3%
6%
3%
4%
6%
6%
4%
8%
1%
3%
2%
2%
3%

Total Top 15
Total All Sources

193
230

84%
100%

Country

14
See. e.g., NATIONAL SCIENCE BOARD, SCIENCE & ENGINEERING INDICATORS 10
(2016) (using doctoral degree counts as key indicators of technology resources in
particular countries and noting that “doctorate recipients add to the most highly trained
segment
of
the
international
[science
and
engineering]
workforce”),
https://www.nsf.gov/statistics/2016/nsb20161/uploads/1/1/overview.pdf [https://perma.cc
/5HFC-MT2F].
15
The earned doctorate counts in this figure are extracted from NATIONAL SCIENCE
BOARD, supra note 7, at app. tbl.2–38, 2–39 (last visited Aug. 31, 2018).
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While these doctoral degree counts suggest that highly trained
United States innovators will probably constitute the single largest
national group pursuing future technological advances, much of
the new expertise in science and engineering is likely to be located
outside the United States. PhD recipients from the United States
only constituted about 17% of the recent totals. While the home
countries of doctoral degree recipients may not completely match
the countries where the recipients will work (for example, a German degree recipient may relocate to and complete research in the
United States), the home countries of these degree recipients provide a rough measure of the new expertise flowing into various
countries.16
Using this measure, future technology development by foreign
PhD recipients may produce about 83% of all advances (corresponding to the percentage of PhD recipients in science and engineering fields from countries other than the United States). As with
R&D spending, the worldwide distribution of state-of-the-art science and engineering expertise (as reflected in the location of recent PhD recipients) suggests that much of the future of technology
development lies outside the United States.
C. Science and Engineering Article Production
Scientific and engineering academic publications provide further evidence of probable foreign sources of technology innovation. Large numbers of published academic articles tend to correlate with intensive academic research activities and substantial innovation capabilities.17 Institutions where academic research concerning science and engineering is flourishing are settings where
related technology innovation is likely.18 While not all academic
findings described in published scientific and engineering articles
will translate into new technology designs, such findings are often
16

See. e.g., NATIONAL SCIENCE BOARD, supra note 14, at 10 .
See, e.g., NATIONAL SCIENCE BOARD, supra note 7, ch. 5, at 92 (last visited Aug. 29,
2018) (“The output volume of research, article counts, is one basic indicator of the degree
to which different performers contribute to the world’s production of research-based
[science and engineering] knowledge.”).
18
See id.
17
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the jumping off point for new products and services. The academics who have made the findings may be the best positioned to pursue or at least aid related technology development. Furthermore,
the presence of an actively publishing academic community in a
given country implies that many highly trained parties emerging
from the same academic community are probably available for
technology development in that country.
The following figure summarizes recent international trends in
sources of academic publications19:
FIGURE 4
Science and Engineering Articles: 2006 – 2016

19
Originally published in id. at ch. 5–110, Figure 5–22. The article percentages
reflected in this figure are derived from article counts. Id. at ch. 5–127, app. tbl.5–27. For
a more detailed breakdown of article counts by country, see id. at ch. 5–112, Table ch. 5–
23.
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As this figure illustrates, the United States was the largest single source of published academic articles, but was recently
eclipsed in this respect by China in 2016.20 Authors in the United
States accounted for only 17.8% of the published articles in 2016.21
Of the 82.2% produced outside the United States, the top sources
were China (18.6%), India (4.8%), and Japan (4.2%).22 Countries
in the European Union collectively accounted for a substantial
share of all articles in 2016 (26.7%).23 However, large shares were
also produced by other developed countries (11.4%) and developing countries (16.3%).24
The large fraction of published science and engineering articles
emerging from outside of the United States—and particularly the
substantial fraction from developing countries—indicate that in the
future, technological advances will probably come from diverse
sources around the world. Some sources like India, which provide
large numbers of published scientific and engineering works, but
are relatively low in R&D spending, as measured by spending to
GDP ratios,25 appear to have substantial scientific and engineering
talent on hand. The same may be true for developing countries
with substantial numbers of academic publications. Whether this
talent can be translated into comparable high levels of technology

20

See Jeff Tollefson, China Declared World’s Largest Producer of Scientific Articles,
NATURE (Jan. 18, 2018), https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-018-009274?utm_source=twt_nnc&utm_medium=social&utm_campaign=naturenews&sf17957768
4=1 [https://perma.cc/ST5H-Z9JV].
21
See NATIONAL SCIENCE BOARD, supra note 7, ch. 5, at 110, Figure 5–22.
22
See id.
23
See id.
24
See id.
25
Using R&D spending to GDP ratios as measures of R&D spending treats different
counties as if they had the same size economies (that is, the same GDPs) potentially
supporting R&D spending. Differences in these ratios reflect differences in R&D
spending that are not merely reflections of differences in economy sizes across countries.
Thus, for example, the R&D spending ratios in Figure 1 indicate that France (R&D
spending to GDP ratio of 2.22) and Australia (R&D spending to GDP ratio of 2.11)
devote approximately the same fractions of their economy to R&D spending even though
the French economy (with a GDP of about $ 61 billion) is almost three times the size of
the Australian economy (with a GDP of about $23 billion). See NATIONAL SCIENCE
BOARD, supra note 7.
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innovation may depend more on increased R&D spending than on
the cultivation of new scientific and engineering expertise.26 The
publishing track record of these countries suggests that substantial
expertise is present but needs to be matched by R&D spending
support.27 The type of patent-influenced research funding and development described in this article may be a means for these countries to build on their high expertise and academic publishing levels through increased R&D spending.
D. Implications of Recent Dominance of Foreign Innovation
The evidence of the strength of foreign innovation presented to
this point provides a remarkably consistent prediction of foreign
domination in future technological development.28 Whether estimated from R&D spending (with a United States percentage of
26% of worldwide totals in 2015), PhD recipients (United States
percentage of about 17% in 2014), or academic article production
(United States percentage of about 18% in 2016), the United States
seems likely to account for no more than about a quarter of future
research efforts and supporting resources worldwide.29 The remaining three quarters or more of innovation will therefore be
spread across the globe.
Given the magnitude of potential overseas innovation, what are
the incentives promoting overseas innovation? As detailed in the
26

The presence of raw scientific and engineering talent—as evidenced by large
academic communities generating large numbers of academic articles—suggests the
potential ability of talented individuals to solve technical problems and to formulate new
technical designs. However, R&D funding is needed to support design projects
undertaken by these talented individuals and to translate their expertise into workable
technology designs. Furthermore, even if new technical designs produce some functional
results, further R&D spending may be needed to transform basic designs into popular
products used by numerous consumers. Thus, while extensive technical expertise is
necessary to support technology development, the addition of substantial R&D spending
to apply the expertise is also needed to produce successful new technologies with wide
acceptance and importance to technology users and technology suppliers. See Tendayi
Viki, Why R&D Spending Is Not a Measure Of Innovation, FORBES (Aug. 21, 2016, 1:46
AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/tendayiviki/2016/08/21/why-rd-spending-is-not-ameasure-of-innovation/#7dc3407dc77d [https://perma.cc/2P48-LSFZ].
27
See id.
28
See infra Sections II.A– II.C.
29
See infra Sections II.A– II.C.
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next two sections of this article, there are reasons to believe that
patent-influenced incentives for overseas innovation are surprisingly weak.30
Weak patent incentives for overseas innovation are particularly
important since they hinder production of fundamentally new outlier innovations.31 Outlier advances reflecting marked departures
from past technology understanding play key roles in technology
development. These advances have the potential to produce fundamentally new products and services based on the latest scientific
knowledge. Furthermore, outlier advances have the potential to
divert subsequent technology developments in new directions that
innovators might not otherwise have pursued, enriching the technology base or “prior art” from which further innovations can
spring. Outlier advances—roughly the same as the nonobvious advances promoted by the United States patent system32—are the focus of patent systems in most countries.33 These outlier advances
are referred to here for convenience as “patentable advances” or
“patentable technologies.”

30

Patent laws in many foreign countries offer limited incentives due to both the small
size of many foreign economies and the at times weak enforcement of patent laws. See
infra Section III. While patent rights and incentives under United States laws are
available to foreign inventors, the force of United States markets and patent-influenced
rewards under United States laws are not being fully applied to promote advances from
outside the United States. See infra Section IV.
31
Weak patent incentives undercut the normal impacts of patent systems in promoting
the creation of outlier advances. Patent-influenced rewards encourage highly talented
innovators to take risks on innovation projects that prevailing technical knowledge
suggests are likely to fail. The promotion of more high-risk projects by talented
innovators tends to increase the number of outlier advances produced. Absent patent
incentives, highly talented innovators will tend to apply more of their efforts to lower risk
endeavors with greater likelihood of success and returns. See Richard S. Gruner,
Imagination, Invention, and Patent Incentives: The Psychology of Patent Law, U. ILL. J.
L. TECH. & POL’Y. 375 (2017).
32
Patents and associated innovation incentives are limited under United States patent
laws to advances that would not be obvious to a well-informed person of average skill in
the field of the advance. See 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2012); Graham v. John Deere Co. of
Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 3 (1966).
33
For a discussion of the similarities between United States standards for nonobviousness and foreign patent requirements requiring advances to involve an “inventive
step” or other equivalent features, see John Barton, Non-Obviousness, 43 IDEA: THE J.
OF L. & TECH. 475, 475–506 (2003).
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Weak incentives apply to patentable technology innovation undertaken outside the United States for two reasons: 1) the weakness
of the patent rewards and incentives in many of the foreign countries where inventors work, making reliance on home country patent laws a source of only small innovation incentives (for reasons
described more fully in the section III of this article) and 2) the
failure of many foreign inventors to look to patent rewards in the
United States and in other countries with large economies as
sources of major research rewards and incentives for outlier innovations (discussed in section IV of this article).
II. POTENTIAL WEAKNESSES IN HOME COUNTRY PATENT
INCENTIVES
There are several reasons why many innovators may find that
patent laws in their home countries are sources of poor incentives
and potential distractions for innovation projects aimed at patentable advances. This follows from several features of the patent laws
and economies of specific countries, as described in this subsection.
Unfortunately, some observers have suggested that strong
home country intellectual property laws are essential for promoting
local innovation and that important support for technology development can be produced through relatively simple legal changes in
home country laws.34 The view that improved patent laws and enforcement in developing countries will incentivize innovation in
those countries is often expressed, but largely inaccurate. Commentators have claimed that, if only patent laws were strengthened
and regularly enforced in developing country “X,” technological
research and development in that country would be encouraged
and likely to increase materially.35

34

See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of State, Roundtable: Enforcement, A Priority for All Countries
in FOCUS ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 64 (2006), http://photos.state.gov
/libraries/korea/49271/dwoa_122709/Focus-On-Intellectual-Property-Rights.pdf
[https://perma.cc/X7TL-K3G9].
35
See id. This view was captured in the following comments by Joseph Howard, a
senior attorney adviser in the Intellectual Property Rights Branch of the U.S. Customs
and Border Protection Service:
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This view is misleading in at least five respects: 1) even with
strong patent laws, small home country economies will only yield
small innovation rewards; 2) substantive uncertainties about patent
laws and related rights can undercut the value of such rights; 3)
weak enforcement of home country patent rights may further reduce projected patent rewards; 4) local commercial interests in
some developing countries may ensure weak patent enforcement;
and 5) consumer interests may support weak patent enforcement in
some countries. These sources of weak patent rewards in specific
countries are detailed in this subsection.
A. Small Markets Produce Small Rewards at Best
Even where a country has strongly drafted and comprehensively enforced patent laws, if the economy in that country is small, the
scope of patent-influenced revenues and rewards from local patent
enforcement will also tend to be small. The amount of the rewards
is constrained by the size of the local economy. The patent incentives to an innovator in that country from home country patent enforcement will be similarly constrained.
Most patent-mediated rewards for patented advances result
from elevated prices that patent holder, or their licensees, can
charge for goods or services incorporating the patented features.36
Perhaps the most critical obstacle to effective enforcement is the
absence of a full understanding of the value of intellectual property
rights to every nation that engages in international trade.
I’ve spoken in several countries overseas, and in each I was asked,
‘Why should we do this? Why are we protecting the wealthy nations
or manufacturers who own these intellectual property rights?’
My response is that, first, if your country is governed by the rule of
law and has signed certain international agreements, it is obligated to
adhere to its agreements. Secondly, as your country develops its own
sectors in which manufacturers, inventors, or artisans are creating
intellectual property, it’s important that you give them the full value
of their rights. Id.
36
See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (1994) (Patent rights typically give a patent holder exclusive
control over the use, making, selling, and importation of a patented advance. Patent
holders can use these rights to force consumers to pay elevated prices for patented goods
or services, subject to the limit that consumers will not pay more for patented items over
unpatented substitutes performing the same function than the incremental utility of the
patented items will justify (e.g., if a patented item provides 20% more functionality that
an earlier unpatented item, it is unlikely that consumers will pay more than 20% more for
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The maximum amount that a patent holder can hope to gain for
sales of a patented produce in a given country is the aggregate
amount that consumers will pay for items with the patented feature
over products without the feature.37 Where there are either few
consumers who will pay elevated prices for a patented item or the
amount each will pay is small, the aggregate rewards for a patented
advance will also be small. Consequently, small populations or
small economies usually produce small patent rewards.
These rewards will be dwarfed by the comparable patentinfluenced revenues available in the United States. This is simply a
consequence of the relative size of the economies involved. Sales
charges, or equivalent charges for use of patented advances, produce patent-mediated rewards for patented inventions. Smaller
sales volumes, as would occur in a developing economy as opposed to in the United States, produce smaller rewards.

the patented version). Patent rights controlling the use, making and importation of
patented items are generally used as compliments to rights to control the sale of the
items; these rights are exercised to ensure that patented items are only obtained through
supply chains authorized by a patent holder and in which the patent holder gains either an
elevated sale price or an equivalent licensing royalty.).
37
This maximum profit estimate assumes that the patent holder captures all the
increased market value of the patented item over non-patented substitutes. In real
commercial processes, this value will probably be split among consumers, product
suppliers, retail outlets, and the patent holder. Thus, if a patented advance works 20%
better than its unpatented counterpart, it might be priced at an amount 15% above that for
its non-patented counterparts. Of this 15% increment, the patent holder might receive a
patent licensing royalty of 5%, while the product manufacturer and the retailer that sold
the item might retain about 5% of the heightened sales price each. The latter two
percentages give these parties incentives to shift emphasis in their respective activities to
the patented item rather than its unpatented predecessor. The difference between the
amount paid and the increased utility received by the consumer (20% - 15% = 5%) is net
benefit retained by the consumer, giving this party an incentive to shift from use of the
older unpatented item to a new patented version with new benefits but also new use
uncertainties. These benefit-sharing numbers, while hypothetical, are illustrative of how
the full utility of a patented advance may not produce profits in the hands of a patent
holder, but instead produce profits that will be shared by all parties in the supply chain,
including consumers, who have a stake in the new utility.
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B. Substantive Legal Uncertainties May Muddy Patent
Enforcement and Weaken Incentives
Relatively recently drafted and occasionally enforced patent
laws in foreign countries may also create weak innovation incentives due to substantive uncertainties in patent laws or uncertain
perceptions of such laws.38 Strong patent incentives require that
potential innovators have knowledge of the criteria for patent issuance and confidence that the likelihood of patent-influenced rewards will be enhanced if the patenting criteria are met.39 Where
patent laws are uncertain, the size of patent rewards and incentives
are correspondingly discounted and have a reduced impact in encouraging innovation.40 In a parallel fashion, uncertain patent incentives undercut research funding and invention marketing efforts. Parties who fear that their research funding may provide
profits for other concerns are likely to place their funding elsewhere and avoid the threats of free riders. Likewise, persons considering developing new products and marketing campaigns based
on patented advances are less likely to do so if they feel that their
product perfection or marketing outlays will result in profits for
others because patent-influenced exclusivity of the resulting products and market demand cannot be maintained.

38
Previous researchers have noted that uncertainty in legal penalties can undercut the
deterrent effect of the penalties by causing those threatened to discount the size of the
penalties by the amounts of the relevant uncertainties. Where it is highly uncertain that
large penalties will be imposed, the deterrent impact of the penalties is decreased
accordingly. Uncertain legal standards therefore undercut the deterrent function of the
penalties imposed under the standards. See, e.g., Richard Craswell & John E. Calfee,
Deterrence and Uncertain Legal Standards, 2 J. OF LAW, ECON. & ORG. 279 (1986). The
same is true in reverse for the incentives created by patent laws. Uncertain rewards create
weaker incentives than rewards of the same value that are more certain to be gained.
Uncertainty about whether patent laws apply (and whether associated patent-mediated
rewards will be gained) undercuts the incentive function of the uncertain laws over
similar laws that are either clearer or more consistently enforced.
39
See id.
40
See, e.g., Adam Mossoff, Uncertain Patent Rights and a Weakening U.S. Innovation
Economy, LANDSLIDE 40, 42 (Sept./Oct. 2018) (“[L]egal uncertainty [regarding patent
rights] undermines decisions to invest in and create the new inventions and innovative
commercial arrangements that lead to new products and services in the innovation
economy.”); see also Blog Comment, IP WATCHDOG (Aug. 14, 2018) (“[A] sure way to
make U.S. patents all the more weaker . . . is to make/allow/perpetuate law almost no
one can decipher [and] effectively rely on.”).
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C. Weak Enforcement May Further Undercut Patent Value
In many developing countries, patent laws on the books are
poorly enforced.41 The promise of patent rewards through home
country patent enforcement in these countries must be further reduced to reflect lost rewards corresponding to unremedied patent
infringement. The projected net revenues perceived by an inventor
in Country X following the patenting and commercial development
of his or her invention in that country will be discounted by the
chances that the invention involved will simply be copied without
compensation due to poor patent enforcement, causing the inventor
involved to realize little or nothing from patent enforcement.
In some countries, patent enforcement maybe be very weak—
at least relative to United States levels. Systematic assessments of
foreign intellectual property (IP) systems and the value of IP rights
in these systems have revealed significant weaknesses and reasons
to doubt the value of rights there. For example, after scrutinizing
foreign enforcement of intellectual property (IP) laws across numerous countries, the Global Intellectual Property Center of the
United States Chamber of Commerce rated the effectiveness of
many countries’ IP rights enforcement substantially below United
States levels.42 Rights enforcement ratings for many countries were
half or less of comparable ratings for the United States. Low ratings were applied to several countries with large economies, such
as Brazil (47% of the United States rating), China (38%), Russia
(37%), and India (22%).43 Several countries received even lower
IP enforcement ratings.44 In countries with weak IP rights enforcement, receipt of substantial patent-influenced rewards based
on local laws may be an illusion for home country inventors.45
41

See M. PUGATCH, D. TORSTENNSSON & R. CHU, CREATE U.S. CHAMBER
INTERNATIONAL IP INDEX (6th ed. 2018) http://www.theglobalipcenter.com/wpcontent/uploads/2018/02/GIPC_IP_Index_2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/X76Z-4WTJ].
42
See id.
43
Id. at 48.
44
The lowest reported level was that for Venezuela at only 9% of the United States
rating. Id.
45
Home country and foreign patent holders may fare equally poorly in IP litigation in
some of these countries. For example, recent research concerning the enforcement of
patent rights by Chinese and foreign holders of patents in China has shown that these two
groups achieved comparable success rates, undercutting concerns about discrimination in

882

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. XXIX:861

This contrasts with the generally strong enforcement of civil
legal claims in the United States, including claims for patent infringement, and the potential in the United States for either large
patent-induced royalties through the threat of rights enforcement46
or substantial patent infringement damage recoveries. Beyond the
heightened patent value resulting from its far larger economy, the
United States provides a stronger patent enforcement environment
than many countries.47 The United States offers patent holders a
mature patent ecosystem, including a sophisticated patent prosecution bar and experienced patent litigators, a frequently tested body
of patent law clarified in many details through extensive case hold-

Chinese courts against foreign patent holders. See Renjun Bian, How Foreign Patentees
Fared in Patent Litigation in China, PATENTLY-O (Feb. 6, 2018), https://patentlyo.com
/patent/2018/02/things-infringement-litigation.html
[https://perma.cc/XR5X-8TQD].
However, the evaluation in this study of all patent infringement judgements reached by
Chinese courts in 2014 suggests that few patent holders are receiving relief there for
patent infringement. The study found only 1663 findings of patent infringement in
Chinese courts during 2014 (taking into account judgments for both Chinese and foreign
patent holders). This compares with over 1,302,687 Chinese patents issued in 2014.
While the judgements rendered in 2014 are not a direct match to the patents issued in the
same year—indeed, the judgments presumably reflected Chinese patents issued in many
years—the ratio between numbers of patent interests outstanding and numbers of
successful enforcement efforts is striking. The successful patent infringement findings in
Chinese courts were only 1,663 / 1,302,687 = .0013 or .13% of the rate of patent issuance
in 2014. This suggests that the vast majority of Chinese patent holders may not be
receiving successful patent enforcement relief, at least through Chinese judicial
processes. See id.
46
The value of a patent in supporting patent licensing and related royalty returns
depends directly on the threatened force and value of a patent in litigation. “A patent
without enforcement value has no licensing value.” Gene Quinn, A Patent Without
Enforcement Value Has No Licensing Value, IP WATCHDOG (Sept. 21, 2017),
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2017/09/21/patent-without-enforcement-valuelicensing/id=88089/ [https://perma.cc/U685-9NW6].
47
In an evaluation by the Global Innovation Policy Center of intellectual property
rights enforcement within the legal systems of several countries, enforcement within the
United States received the highest rating. See Global Innovation Policy Center, supra
note 41, at 48. The strengths noted in the United States’ IP enforcement system included:
1) support for key IP rights, including sector-specific rights, 2) a largely supportive
technology transfer and commercialization environment in the United States (despite
some weakness due to uncertainty in systems essential patent (SEP) licensing, 3) a
generally deterrent IP enforcement framework, 4) active inter-governmental coordination
regarding IP issues, and 5) government public awareness raising and engagement on IP.
See id. at 156.
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ings,48 and a powerful, sanction-backed system for enforcing civil
damage recoveries and injunctive relief. Further enforcement
mechanisms, such as the efforts of the United States Border Patrol
in monitoring and interdicting imports of infringing goods,49add to
the substantiality of United States patent law enforcement. The result is that United States patent rights have real meaning in United
States markets,50 resulting in corresponding value in royalties or
patent-influenced prices.51
D. Local Commercial Interests in Developing Countries May
Favor Continued Weak Patent Enforcement
Patent rewards in some developing countries may also be small
because government officials support weak patent enforcement to
serve local commercial interests. For a given developing country,
stronger enforcement of patent laws may be a mixed blessing. If
local parties see few if any net benefits from strong patent enforcement,52 the alternative of weak enforcement will be likely to

48
Clarity in patent law, while a general virtue of the United States patent system, is not
uniform across all technology areas. For example, in 2018 the United States Department
of Commerce, while giving the United States intellectual property system its highest
rating among intellectual property legal ecosystems around the world, pointed out that
one notable weakness in the United States’ generally strong system was the
“[u]ncertainty over patentability for high-tech sectors.” See Global Innovation Policy
Center, supra note 41, at 156.
49
See U.S. Customs and Border Protection, CBP Enforcement of Intellectual Property
Rights (Aug. 2012), https://www.cbp.gov/document/publications/cbp-enforcementintellectual-property-rights [https://perma.cc/S63Y-QZ8S].
50
In comparison with the counterpart features of other legal systems, the Global
Innovation Policy Center gave the United States civil legal system the highest possible
rating for the recognition of IP as an asset and for the quality of civil and procedural
remedies for IP rights infringement. See PUGATCH ET AL., supra note 41, at 156.
51
An estimate by the United States Patent and Trademark Office and the Economics &
Statistics Administration of the Department of Commerce placed the value added to the
United States economy by patent-intensive industries at $763 in 2010 rising to $881
billion in 2014. See Economics & Statistics Administration & U.S. Patent and Trademark
Office, Intellectual Property and the U.S. Economy: 2016 Update 22 (2016),
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/IPandtheUSEconomySept2016.pdf
[https://perma.cc/KD7H-XQSG].
52
A number of technology development and access experts have argued that
strengthening IP rights in developing countries imposes burdens on these countries that
are not commensurate with the associated benefits. Walter G. Park and Douglas C.
Lippoldt have summarized these criticisms as follows:

884

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. XXIX:861

prevail, and patent rights in that country will provide few incentives for innovation.
Different parties within a developing country may see the merit
of strong patent enforcement very differently. For innovators,
strong patent enforcement will be desirable because it will provide
at least some rewards for innovation (albeit perhaps modest rewards in countries with small economies). Additional parties may
also have interests in strong patent protection. For parties seeking
to expand manufacturing activities based on technologies drawn
from other countries, the reassurance of strong patent controls in a
country with manufacturing capabilities may encourage transfers
into the countries of patent-protected technologies and encourage
expanded manufacturing based on the new technologies. In a similar fashion, strong patent protection in a country may encourage
increased investment in manufacturing operations based on imported technologies, since patent protections will lessen investors
risks in such manufacturing enterprises. However, for consumers
of patent-protected products, strong patent enforcement may mean
higher prices and lower access to desired items. The net benefit of
increased patent enforcement in a particular country will depend
on the combination of these positive and negative impacts.

The accusation is that the emerging standards raise the cost of
intellectual content in products sought by developing countries, while
developing countries may not have the capacity to capitalise on their
own potential in a similar manner. Moreover, [Carlos Maria] Correa
alleges that the implicit bargain underlying the strengthening of the
international IPR regime has not been satisfied. Some developing
countries have argued in the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and
World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO) that promises of
technology transfer as contained in the TRIPS Agreement . . . do not
appear to be yielding corresponding benefits for developing
countries, whereas the strengthened IPR may raise costs for
developing countries seeking to upgrade their technological
capabilities.
Walter G. Park & Douglas C. Lippoldt, Technology Transfer and the Economic
Implications of the Strengthening of Intellectual Property Rights in Developing
Countries, http://nw08.american.edu/~wgp/park_lippoldt08.pdf [https://perma.cc/47TBB6HV] (last visited Jan. 23, 2019) (citing Carlos Maria Correa, How Intellectual
Property Rights Can Obstruct Progress, SCIDEV.NET (April 4, 2005),
https://www.scidev.net/global/r-d/opinion/how-intellectual-property-rights-can-obstructprog.html [https://perma.cc/DU3K-45SV]).
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Projecting the future advantages of strong patent enforcement
in expanded innovation, manufacturing, or investment may be
highly speculative (as with any complex projection of the future)
and be far overshadowed by the current disadvantages of patent
enforcement, namely higher prices and product restrictions. Disadvantages now will loom larger and be more persuasive than hoped
for advantages later. Hence, policy makers may rationally choose
to maintain poor patent enforcement in some countries.
E. Consumer Interests May Dominate Political Processes and
Preclude Support for Patent Enforcement and Higher Product
Prices
Weak patent enforcement may prevail in a particular country
because it is the politically popular choice. Consumers of technical
advances—that is, buyers of technology-enhanced products and
services—may resist patent-influenced higher product prices even
where commercial leaders and policy makers can see the long-term
advantages of patent incentives and enhanced technology development. Product users who benefit from weak enforcement and
low cost product access unconstrained by patents may be much
larger in number and political power than the advocates of strong
patent enforcement.53 The benefits and burdens of patent enforcement may fall on different parties depending on parties’ interests in
technology development or product manufacturing (which would
tend to make parties favor patent enforcement) versus product use
or consumption (which would tend to make parties oppose patent
enforcement to lower product prices and increase product access).
It is possible that net support for strong patent enforcement in a
given country may boil down to a power struggle between the portions of a country’s population, or the power holders within that
population, who are benefitted and burdened by strong patent enforcement. Strong patent enforcement will only prevail if the range
of parties benefitting from patent-influenced prices for access to

53

See generally Jay P. Kesan & Andres A. Gallo, The Political Economy of the Patent
System, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1341 (2009).
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patented products and services gain control over parties who object
to paying patent-influenced prices.54
The number of parties benefitted or burdened may have some
influence over patent policies and the strength of patent rights enforcement. Where the benefits of patent enforcement fall on a narrow group (such as business owners able to marshal extensive resources and engage in large scale manufacturing), the detriments of
IP enforcement are spread across a larger number of parties (such
as the numerous consumers adversely affected by consumer goods
with prices increased through strong patent enforcement). The political clout of the adversely affected parties may trump the economic clout of the benefitted parties. This may cause a country to
accept the socially popular and administratively easy course of
weak patent enforcement even though the country’s overall economic interests would benefit more from stronger patent enforcement.
F. Adding Up the Cumulative Effects: Why Few Incentives Flow
from Many Home Country Patent Laws
The reasons described here for low innovation rewards available through home country patent enforcement are cumulative. In a
given country, they may all reduce the potential rewards and incentives available to new technology developers who look solely to
home country patent laws. Small economies will unavoidably create small rewards which will be reduced further by doubts about
patent enforcement. Looking to these doubtful rewards, potential
innovators relying solely on home country incentives will often
have little reason to pursue high risk innovation aimed at outlier
54

This analysis is oversimplified in that it ignores the possibility that product
consumers may see an interest in strong patent enforcement as a means to incentivize
innovation and thereby increase the range and quality of products available to consumers.
While these long-term benefits of patent enforcement may be real, they may be
overshadowed in consumers’ minds by the short-term detriments of higher product prices
due to patent enforcement. Such a cost-benefit analysis emphasizing short-term impacts
will tend to cause consumers to oppose strong patent enforcement. Parties taking this
position for their countries’ laws may be content to rely on United States patent laws and
those of other countries with large economies to drive product innovation and produce
new products which can then be introduced in the countries with weak patent
enforcement.
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advances markedly departing from prior, well-understood technical
knowledge. These sorts of technically uncertain projects will simply seem unjustified given further uncertainty about whether successful projects will gain patent-mediated rewards.
In the face of both technical and legal uncertainties, research
resources will tend to be diverted towards more predictably successful enterprises, such as mundane product improvements
through incremental changes made in accordance with current
knowledge to produce predictably successful results.55 These obvious technology changes, while of some technical value, do not
contribute to significant technology shifts and new branches of
technical knowledge in the same ways as outlier advances involving patentable subject matter.
Absent strong incentives for high risk projects departing from
technical adjustments with predictable results, technological advances will stagnate around the standard designs and well understood design principles.56 Patent incentives are designed to break
55
Patent laws create specially targeted incentives to encourage innovators to go
beyond mundane technology adjustments in accordance with widely available technical
knowledge and to reach for advances that are not obvious to most parties in the field of
the advances. The patent system encourages persons to both seek these sorts of nonobvious advances and to disclose them to the public. This combination encourages a few
especially skilled or unusually well-informed innovators to pursue advances that are
beyond the capabilities of most parties in their fields. Beyond focusing these exceptional
innovators on outlier advances, the patent system also encourages such innovators to
disclose their unusual results, thereby ensuring that their rare advances are not lost to the
public or used in secret but rather added to be body of technical knowledge to inform
later technology development. See generally Richard S. Gruner, Why We Need a Strong
Patent System and When: Filling the Void Left by the Bilski Case, 28 SANTA CLARA
COMP. & HIGH TECH. L. J. 499 (2012).
56
Simple alterations to technologies involving small changes and predictable results
will tend to dominate technology development for several reasons. First, development of
these sorts of designs will entail little risk to innovators as they will generally be able to
predict the success of their new designs from the outset of developing the designs. The
risk of project failure will be low and innovators will be able to produce “satisfactory”
new designs with a high degree of certainty. Second, parties seeking to manufacture and
commercialize products with new designs will also tend to minimize their risks if they
deal with new designs that are modest changes to older products that have already been
manufactured and marketed. Manufacturing and marketing of the new products will
benefit from whatever was learned in producing and commercializing their similar
predecessors. The risks of new product failure will again be minimized. Finally, parties
seeking funding and other resources for technology development projects may find it
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this pattern by creating special incentives for inventors to resist
traveling the easy path of obvious adjustments to old designs by
instead seeking significantly new design approaches not previously
obvious to the bulk of technology specialists.57 These sorts of new
outlier advances are the realm of patent incentives.58 Yet, in countries where local patent laws create few incentives for the reasons
detailed here, the promotion of these highly important outlier advances may be very weak.
Fortunately, innovators worldwide are not limited to home
country patent incentives. They can look beyond their own countries’ patent laws and incentives to those in countries with large
economies like the United States.59 Innovators in countries with
small economies or poorly enforced patent laws should give home
country patent rights secondary consideration, if any, and look for
primary incentives and research support via aggressive use of patent rights in the United States.60 Overseas innovators producing

easier to explain and justify major investments in projects advancing technologies along
familiar and predictable lines than in interesting investors and other resource holders in
backing projects with fundamentally new requirements and risks of failure. For all these
reasons, projects involving low-risk changes to prior technology designs will often seem
more meritorious and deserving of attention and support from innovators and their
backers than the high risk projects aiming at unpredictable outlier advances. To overcome
this natural bias against outlier projects and to increase their number, patent incentives
provide extra incentives to parties who not only imagine outlier advances but who bring
these advances to reality and translate them into commercial successes from which patent
rewards can be gained. For a more detailed analysis of the need for patent incentives as
means to overcome human limitations in imagining outlier advances beyond common
technology understanding, see Richard S. Gruner, Imagination, Invention, and Patent
Incentives: The Psychology of Patent Law, 2017 U. OF ILL. J. LAW, TECH. & POLICY 375
(2017).
57
See id.
58
See 35 U.S.C. § 103; Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 13–17 (1966).
59
While the analysis in this article focuses on foreign inventors’ reliance on innovation
incentives derived from United States patent laws and related economic processes,
parallel arguments can be raised encouraging inventors to also look to other strong
economies—such as those within Europe—as sources of further innovation incentives to
supplement those gained through reliance on United States patents and patent rewards. A
strategy of relying on patent laws in further countries will be important in proportion to
the size of the economies of the further countries and the strength, and certainty, of patent
rights there.
60
For simplicity, this article focuses on the advantages of patenting in the United
States. However, many of the same factors favoring patenting in the United States by
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new patentable technologies can serve as technology exporters and
seek compensation for their efforts in the overseas potential for
exports of their work. They can also seek financing and other support for their research based on this overseas potential for their results. But, they can only securely accomplish these intellectual
property exports through reliance on United States patents.
The key to these strategies—both leveraging the overseas potential of outlier research before it is performed and reaping the
overseas rewards for successful results—is reliance on the full patent rights available in the United States to foreign inventors. The
basis for these rights available to foreign inventors—and the
strength of the innovation incentives they create worldwide—are
the subjects of the next section of this article.
III. US PATENTS AS STRONG ALTERNATIVES FOR INCENTIVIZING
FOREIGN INNOVATION
A. Benefits of National Treatment Under United States Patent
Laws
Patent laws of the United States and of most industrialized
countries provide for “national treatment” of inventors. National
treatment means that foreign inventors are treated equally with inventors who are citizens or “nationals” of the countries enacting
the laws.61 Thus, for example, a party making an invention in
Germany can apply for and gain patent rights regarding the invention in the United States in the same way and to the same extent as
a United States citizen making the same invention in the United
States. The German inventor will be treated in the same manner as
a citizen of the United States in applying for and enforcing patent
rights under United States laws.

foreign innovators will also apply to patenting in other countries with large economies
and will, accordingly, support patenting in these further countries.
61
“Stated simply, national treatment requires each government to apply the same
provisions to both its own citizens and foreign nationals.” R. Carl Moy, The History of
the Patent Harmonization Treaty: Economic Self-Interest as an Influence, 26 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 457, 484 (1993).
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National treatment under patent laws and other intellectual
property laws follows from international trade norms requiring
equal treatment of foreign and domestic parties generally. Several
treaties promoting international trade require signatory countries to
provide for national treatment in laws governing sales of goods,
the provision of services, and other trade features. This principle is
reflected in fundamental international standards for commerce and
trade, including all three of the major World Trade Organization
(WTO) treaties: the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT),62 the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS),63
and the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS).64 As summarized by the WTO, international
treaty standards specify that:
Imported and locally-produced goods should be treated equally—at least after the foreign goods have entered the market. The
same should apply to foreign and domestic services, and to foreign
and local trademarks, copyrights and patents.65
National treatment provisions in patent laws are even older
than WTO standards, having roots in the Paris Convention of 1883.
62

“The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the territory of
any other contracting party shall be accorded treatment no less favourable than that
accorded to like products of national origin in respect of all laws, regulations and
requirements affecting their internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation,
distribution or use.” General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, art. III, ¶ 4, (Oct. 30,
1947), http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/gatt47_01_e.htm [https://perma.cc
/2BS6-TKZ8].
63
“[E]ach Member shall accord to services and service suppliers of any other Member,
in respect of all measures affecting the supply of services, treatment no less favourable
than that it accords to its own like services and service suppliers.” General Agreement on
Trade in Services, Annex 1B, art. XVII (Apr. 15, 1994), http://www.wto.org
/english/docs_e/legal_e/26-gats_01_e.htm [https://perma.cc/P2CK-KSJ4].
64
“Each Member shall accord to the nationals of other Members treatment no less
favourable than that it accords to its own nationals with regard to the protection of
intellectual property, subject to the exceptions already provided in, respectively, the Paris
Convention (1967), the Berne Convention (1971), the Rome Convention or the Treaty on
Intellectual Property in Respect of Integrated Circuits.” Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Annex 1C, art. 3 (Apr. 15, 1994),
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/27-trips_03_e.htm [https://perma.cc/M65A35A8].
65
World
Trade
Organization,
Principles
of
the
Trading
System,
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact2_e.htm
[https://perma.cc
/N5TH-AM9K] (last visited Sept. 3, 2018).
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The Paris Convention requires signatory countries to enact patent
laws providing for national treatment of foreign inventors. Terms
of the Paris Convention require that “[n]ationals of countries outside the Union [(that is, nationals of non-signatory countries)] who
are domiciled or who have real and effective industrial or commercial establishments in the territory of one of the countries of the
Union shall be treated in the same manner as nationals of the countries of the Union.”66
Provisions for national treatment under United States patent
laws are particularly important for foreign inventors given the size
of the United States economy and the scope of corresponding markets in this country for patented products and services. United
States laws define the patent rights governing sales and uses of patented items in this country and, in turn, shape the commercial
gains that can be derived from those sales and uses. This follows
from a second feature of United States patent laws: the “territorial”
scope of United States patent laws in fully describing patent rights
within the United States. This feature, which is typical of patent
systems around the world, means that within the United States patent laws of this country (and only those laws) govern the allowed
uses of patented technologies.67
Combined with national treatment, the territorial characteristics
of United States patent laws means that foreign inventors can look
to the full force of United States patent laws to gain invention re66
Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, art. 3 (Sept. 28, 1979),
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/paris/trtdocs_wo020.html
[https://perma.cc/VZ64XF3D].
67
Territorial scope is a feature of patent laws around the world. Thus, German patent
law governs what may be done with a technology if patented in that country, while
French patent law governs what may be done with the same technology if patented in that
country. If no patent is obtained in a given country, a publicly disclosed technology
typically can be used freely in that country (subject to other legal standards such as health
and safety laws that might still curtail certain uses). Of course, once a product is sought to
be exported from a country where no constraints apply into a country where patent rights
are applicable, the patent laws of the latter may restrict the importation, sale, distribution,
and use of the product. See, e.g., World Intellectual Property Association, What Is a
Patent?, https://www.wipo.int/patents/en/ [https://perma.cc/TJ8S-MLTJ] (last visited on
Jan. 2, 2019) (“Patents are territorial rights. In general, the exclusive rights are only
applicable in the country or region in which a patent has been filed and granted, in
accordance with the law of that country or region.”).
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wards in the United States economy. Inventors around the world
are thereby brought into the United States patent system and encouraged to produce the types of advances desired by consumers
here.
Of course, the opposite is true for United States inventors, who
are reciprocally incentivized by foreign patent systems to produce
items desired by foreign consumers. For example, innovators in the
United States are incentivized and benefitted by national treatment
under provisions of German patent laws.68 These provisions specify that a party producing an invention in the United States is entitled to obtain a patent in Germany under the same standards and
procedures as a German citizen and to gain whatever commercial
rewards are available under such a patent. Thus, German laws encourage United States innovators to produce advances valued in
Germany, to the extent that these are different than those valued in
the United States.
National treatment also encourages innovators to consider the
world-wide demand for various types of innovations (that its, the
aggregate commercial demand in the United States, Germany, and
multiple other countries to the extent that patents are obtained in
those countries) when considering the overall commercial potential
for new innovations. Many advances, addressing common concerns such as health and safety, will have parallel utility and commercial value in multiple countries. Where the desires of consumers for new technologies are similar in multiple countries, national
treatment provisions of patent laws ensure that the incentives for
meeting the common desires add up to produce elevated incentives
reflecting the combined interest in innovations.
National treatment provisions in patent systems of foreign
countries—now combined with patent application aids such as
provisions of the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) that streamline
patent applications in multiple countries69—ensure that parties
68

See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of State, 2015 Investment Climate Statement – Germany, May
2015, https://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/2015/241572.htm [https://perma.cc/99TJ2ZS6] (last visited Oct. 1, 2018) (“Foreigners may register patents subject to exactly the
same terms as German nationals at the German Patent and Trade Mark Office.”).
69
For an overview of the Patent Cooperation Treaty system and its advantages in
promoting patent applications in multiple countries, see World Intellectual Property
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producing advances valued in multiple countries can gain patents
and patent rewards across those countries. The resulting sum of
rewards available in multiple patent systems promotes innovation
above and beyond the incentives of any one patent system, encouraging attention to advances with value and commercial potential
across many countries.
While the availability of patent rewards in multiple countries
due to national treatment provisions is important in driving and
prioritizing international technology development, for the sake of
simplicity, this article focuses on the impact of national treatment
provisions in just the United States and the implications of these
provisions for international technology development. The article
examines the potential for United States patent laws and associated
commercial rewards from the United States economy to incentivize
and encourage new technology production and cultivation elsewhere. In considering cross-border patent rewards emanating from
the United States, the article treats these rewards as inducements
for foreign inventions that can substitute for home country incentives where patent laws are weak or are of little commercial value.
While other factors, such as gaps in technical expertise, supporting
infrastructure, or research financing, may still limit the development of new technologies in some foreign countries, the availability of commercial rewards in the United States can help put innovators in foreign countries on the same plane as their United States
counterparts and encourage these foreign innovators (and companies or investors who support them) to target and pursue new technology development efforts with high profit potential and utility.

Organization, Summary of the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) (2018), http://
www.wipo.int/treaties/en/registration/pct/summary_pct.html
[https://perma.cc/9AZZJGJY] (last visited Sept. 3, 2018). The PCT makes it possible to seek patent protection
for an invention simultaneously in many countries by filing an “international” patent
application (typically referred to as a “PCT Application”). Ultimately, an applicant filing
such an application can determine whether it will be submitted to and considered by
patent offices in specific countries that adhere to the PCT (which now include most major
industrialized nations). Additional provisions of the PCT include timing provisions
regarding the filing of patent applications that are generally more favorable to patent
applicants than the timing deadlines that would prevail if the applicants filed applications
directly with patent offices in specific countries. See id.
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B. Purposes Underlying National Treatment in Patent Laws
Requirements of national treatment for international technology innovators serve several valuable purposes. These include ensuring fairness to foreign providers of useful technologies, simplifying legal disputes involving patent rights, encouraging international propagation of new technologies, and promoting equallysituated competition among international producers of products
incorporating patented features or utilizing patented production
methods.
1. Ensuring Fairness to Foreign Inventors
National treatment provisions of patent laws are motivated partially by fairness concerns about possible discrimination against
foreign actors.70 In the specific sphere of technology development,
discrimination against foreign actors may involve the misappropriation and use of technologies originated by these parties without
compensation or with less compensation than would have been
given if the actors were domestic rather than foreign parties. As
parties rely on and gain value from foreign-originated new technologies, fairness dictates that the foreign inventors originating
valuable technologies receive the same rewards for their inventions
as domestic parties producing similarly valuable technologies.
Fairness requires equal treatment for equal value rendered to innovation users. A moral entitlement to a reward derives from an act
of invention coupled with the addition to the public sphere of utility gains resulting from use of the invention.71 The utility gained
70

National treatment provisions ensure that “all persons are equal before the law.
Using the same law in each country for every litigant minimizes discrimination against
the foreigner.” David R. Toraya, Federal Jurisdiction over Foreign Copyright
Infringement Actions – An Unsolicited Reply to Professor Nimmer, 70 CORNELL L. REV.
1165, 1171 (1985). See also Thad W. Simons Jr., International Copyright and
Neighboring Rights, 79 AM. J. INT’L L 1115–16 (1985).
71
A moral basis for patent rights and associated patent-influenced rewards to
successful inventors for transfers of useful inventions to society stems from a Lockian
view of labor and property. John Locke argued that labor invested in a project should
result in property ownership of the project results. As summarized by Adam Moore and
Ken Himma, the Lockean justification of patent law “begins with the claim that
individuals are entitled to control the fruits of their labor….Laboring, producing,
thinking, and persevering are voluntary, and individuals who engage in these activities
are entitled to what they produce. Subject to certain restrictions, rights are generated
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from an invention—and, correspondingly, the entitlement to a reward—is the same regardless of the location of the act of invention
or the citizenship of the inventor. National treatment of inventors
helps to ensure that this moral entitlement is realized by inventors
who gain patents; they receive patent-influenced rewards regardless of citizenship or invention location.
Of course, the scope of rewards for particular inventions will
vary with both the popularity of the inventions with the public and
the provisions of applicable patent laws in individual countries.
However, taking these factors into account, the resulting patentinfluenced rewards for a given invention in a given country should
be equal for inventors from all countries. All inventors, regardless
of location or nationality, have equal moral claims for rewards
based on valuable acts of invention and corresponding contributions to public utility. National treatment provisions help to ensure
that these sorts of equal claims to patent rewards are satisfied and
that foreign and domestic inventors are given fair and equal access
to commercial opportunities influenced by patent rights.
2. Simplifying Patent Enforcement Litigation
Another benefit of national treatment under patent laws is that
patent enforcement disputes are simplified by applying the same
country laws to all patents in a given country regardless of where
patented inventions were made. As noted by David R. Toraya, national treatment has several beneficial impacts on patent litigation:
[N]ational treatment provides practical benefits for both the
courts and the litigants in allowing for the application of forum
law. Courts prefer to apply their own law, with which they are fawhen individuals mix their labor with an unowned object.” Adam Moore & Ken Himma,
Intellectual Property in THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. (Edward N. Zalta ed.)
(Winter 2014) (citations omitted), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2014/entries
/intellectual-property [https://perma.cc/FV42-7YNY]. “The intuition is that the person
who clears unowned land, cultivates crops, builds a house, or creates a new invention
obtains property rights by engaging in these activities. . . .” Id. “The idea is that . . . we
each own our labor and when that labor is mixed with objects in the commons, our rights
are expanded to include these goods.” Id. Patent rewards result when inventors exchange
their labor-based ownership of inventions for commercial gains. These gains follow as
inventors grant access to their inventions (as protected by patents) through
commercialization transactions. Id.
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miliar. Similarly, using only one law makes it unnecessary to apply
a variety of foreign laws within a single transaction or court case.
Judicial efficiency is served when courts do not have to rely upon
translations of foreign statutes and case law, and the risk of distorted or inaccurate translations is abated. National treatment thus results in sounder decisions and increased certainty in the law.72
In addition to promoting certainty by allowing courts to apply
familiar home country patent laws in resolving patent cases, national treatment also increases certainty in patent litigation by
avoiding threshold disputes over which laws apply to inventions
made by persons of multiple nationalities.73 For example, in the
absence of national treatment requirements, the United States
might provide diminished patent rights to German inventors. Beyond the need to keep track of a special set of patent standards
governing these diminished rights, courts would also have to determine in particular cases whether the diminished rights applied.
These sorts of threshold disputes about the governing laws would
be particularly difficult to resolve in cases where an invention was
produced by persons of multiple nationalities such as a team of
German and United States scientists. National treatment standards
make the composition of such teams irrelevant and reduce litigation uncertainty accordingly by focusing attention of courts and
litigants on a single set of patent laws which is ascertainable from
the outset of relevant cases.74
3. Encouraging International Propagation of New
Technologies
National treatment under patent laws also helps to ensure that
foreign technology innovators have incentives to bring new technologies into a country without fear that the technology will be
copied freely because the foreign party is unable to gain rights controlling the use of the technology. One impact is to encourage in72

Toraya, supra note 70, at 1171; see also Simons Jr., supra note 70.
See Toraya, supra note 70, at 1172 (noting the clarifying effect of national treatment
in determining that the law to be applied in patent disputes is generally that of the country
where patent infringement is asserted to have occurred regardless of the nationality of the
inventors involved).
74
See id.
73
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novators to rely on patent protections (with public disclosures of
intentions) rather than on trade secret protections (with continuing
secrecy about inventions). Absent national treatment protections
for foreign-originated technologies, overseas technology producers
would try to restrict their technologies as trade secrets, thereby
limiting public access to the advances and hindering the propagation of the advances to new countries. National treatment guarantees in other countries reassure innovators that they will have
meaningful patent rights in overseas settings and that they can rely
on patent laws to protect disclosed technologies rather than restricting access to the technologies under trade secret controls.
National treatment protections also promote international propagation of technical “know-how” needed to fully utilize patented
inventions. Where an innovator obtains a patent on an advance in
one country (thereby revealing the advance to the public through
the description in the patent), the innovator might still seek to restrict widespread use of the advance in other countries by maintaining close control over private know how needed to fully use the
publicly disclosed technology. Patent rights in overseas settings,
ensured in part by national treatment standards, help to reassure an
innovator that he or she can bring a new patented technology into a
country and rely on patent controls in that country to prevent unauthorized use of the technology there. Once a patent is obtained in a
foreign nation and an innovator can rely on national treatment
there, the inventor’s need to rely on know how access restrictions
to maintain control over a new technology there will be lessened,
and fewer controls will tend to be imposed.
Rather than trying to restrict access to their new advances, innovators will have reasons to encourage and support more use of
new technologies in countries where patents are obtained. With
patent rights in a foreign venue allowing the rights holder to charge
for the use of a patented technology in that venue, a patent holder
has a direct stake in expanded use of a patented advance in the
venue. Because of this, a technology innovator with a foreign patent strengthened by national treatment guarantees will be encouraged to bring a new technology into the venue along with the personnel and trade secret knowledge needed to assist licensees or
other authorized parties to maximize use of the technology. The
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more authorized and paid for use of the patented technology, the
more the patent holder will stand to gain in the foreign venue. Absent viable patent rights backed up by national treatment guarantees, the technology originator will have incentives to resist this
type of potentially uncompensated technology transfer by all
means possible.
4. Promoting Competition Between Producers in Multiple
Countries
Provisions for national treatment also tend to discourage free
riding in international commerce as firms in multiple countries
produce goods that are destined for competition in other countries.
Absent national treatment, an innovator might be able to gain control over a new technology in his or her home country but see the
technology used freely in a second country because the foreign
party was precluded from gaining or enforcing patent rights in that
country. Goods produced with the freely used technology in the
second country would be produced at a lower cost than equivalent
goods produced in the first country where patent controls, and
charges for use of the technology, applied. As producers of the
same goods in the first and second countries competed for sales in
a third country, the producers in the second country where patent
holders received no rewards would be significantly advantaged.
National treatment ensures that the technology innovator can gain
rights to his or her technology in the second country and can
charge for the technology’s use there in the same manner that the
originator charges in his or her home country. This, in turn, helps
to equalize production costs for uses of technology worldwide and
protects an equal plane of competition among producers in multiple countries regarding products incorporating patented advances
(or manufacturing using patented advances) no matter where that
later competition occurs.
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IV. UTILIZING THE NATIONAL TREATMENT BENEFITS OF UNITED
STATES PATENTS
A. Widespread Lost Opportunities—The Missing Patents
Remarkably, given the potential opportunities afforded through
United States patents, many inventors located outside the United
States are apparently failing to seek out the patents needed to gain
valuable rewards from the United States economy.75 Foreign innovators pursue low rates of United States patenting, despite the
presence in many countries of substantial research and development (R&D) spending and extensive innovation resources such as
large numbers of recent doctoral degree recipients and highly active academic communities. This subsection reviews the evidence
indicating that innovators in many countries with substantial R&D
capabilities are not taking the opportunities afforded by national
treatment under United States patent laws. These countries reflect
noticeably low patenting rates given their R&D expenditures.
Countries where innovators are apparently foregoing the incentives offered under United States patent laws stand in contrast to a
few countries where inventors are embracing these incentives.
There, United States patenting is at high rates relative to R&D levels. The rates of patenting in some countries are even higher than
for United States inventors, suggesting that innovators in these
countries have chosen to emphasize patented technology innovation and exports of valuable technologies to the United States to
gain compensation through United States patent enforcement. A

75

As explored more fully in subsection 1 below, innovators in many countries with
substantial R&D spending are not translating such spending into advances covered by
United States patent applications. For example, innovators in China are seeking United
States patents at about one tenth the rate per dollar of R&D spending as United States
inventors. For fiscal year 2016, the rate of United States patent applications per dollar of
R&D spending for United States inventors was about 641.25, while the comparable rate
for Chinese inventors was only 68.30. Additional rates of patenting per R&D spending
dollar for other countries are contained in Figure 1 below. These rates are based on R&D
spending figures and patent application counts. See NATIONAL SCIENCE BOARD, supra
note 7, at 37, tbl.4–5; U.S. Patent Office, PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT
FY17 172 (2017), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/USPTOFY17PAR
.pdf [https://perma.cc/DS37-UTTF].
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few of the countries with this United States patenting strategy are
profiled in subsection IV.C of this article.
1. Indicators of Low Patenting Despite Substantial R&D
Spending
The low United States patenting levels for innovators in many
countries with substantial R&D spending is apparent from
measures of patenting per R&D spending dollar. Such measures
adjust patenting patterns to eliminate the effects of economy size
differences across countries and associated differences in R&D
spending. Countries with relatively low patenting per R&D spending dollar are either 1) not producing patentable advances (focusing instead on lesser advances or not achieving substantial numbers of advances at all) or, 2) despite producing patentable advances, are making choices about legal and commercial strategies in
foreign commercialization that forego United States patenting and
the potential rewards for such patenting.
The following figure summarizes the patenting per R&D
spending patterns for the ten countries with the top R&D spending
levels76:

76

R&D spending amounts used in this figure were extracted from NATIONAL SCIENCE
BOARD, supra note 7, tbl.4–5, at 37. All of the R&D spending amounts reflect estimates
in current purchasing power parity (PPP) United States dollars. Patent application counts
used this figure were extracted from United States Patent Office, supra note 75.The
country source of patent applications with inventors from more than one country was
presumed to be the country of the lead inventor. See United States Patent Office, supra
note 75. The US applications per R&D spending rates in the last column of Figure 5
simply reflect the ratios of the figures in the first two columns. For example, the rate
shown in the third column of Figure 5 for United States inventors reflected the number of
applications by United States inventors in fiscal year 2016 divided by the amount of
R&D spending in the United States or 318701 / 497 = 641.25.
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FIGURE 5
US Patent Applications FY 2016

Country
United States
China
Japan
Germany
South Korea
France
United Kingdom
Switzerland
Netherlands
Sweden

R&D
Number
US Apps
Amount of Apps
per R&D
(Billion $) 2016
497
409
170
115
74
61
46
18
17
15

318701
27935
91383
33254
41823
13489
14824
5862
6676
5699

641.25
68.30
537.55
289.17
565.18
221.13
322.26
325.67
392.71
379.93

Many of these countries reflect about the same levels of United
States patent applications per R&D spending, suggesting that large
differences in raw patent numbers across these countries may
mainly reflect differences in the sizes of country research efforts or
associated differences in country economy sizes. Using the United
States values in this figure as an indication of baseline or “typical”
levels of R&D conversion to patent applications, similar but modestly lower levels are present for innovators in Japan and Korea.
Innovators in these countries appear to be translating R&D funding
into patentable advances and United States patent applications at
about the same rates as their United States counterparts.
The same is not true, however, for innovators in Europe (at
least within the countries shown). Lower (but roughly consistent)
patenting levels are present across several European technology
producers, including the United Kingdom (322.26 patent applications per billion dollars R&D spending), Switzerland (325.67),
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Netherlands (392.71), and Sweden (379.93).77 Yet, even the best of
these R&D to patenting conversion rates is well below that for the
United States. For example, controlling for differences in R&D
spending levels, innovators in the United Kingdom sought patents
at a rate that was only about 50% of the counterpart rate in the
United States.
Two European technology giants—Germany (289.17) and
France (221.13)—show patenting rates that are even lower.78
These rates are lower than for several European counterparts. For
example, the R&D to patenting conversion rate for German innovators is only about 74% of that for researchers in the Netherlands.
Even more dramatically, the rates for Germany and France are only about 45% and 34% of the rate for United States inventors. Why
innovators in Germany and France are pursuing United States patents at such low levels is not clear. Some possible reasons for low
patenting rates are considered in subsection IV(B) below.
Finally, among these top sources of United States patent applications in 2016, the patenting rates for China are especially low.
Adjusted for R&D spending levels of the two countries, the rate for
Chinese innovators (68.30) was only about 11% of the rate for
United States innovators.79 Clearly, there are substantial differences in the ways that Chinese R&D spending is converted into
United States patents in comparison with the same conversion process in the United States.
China is not alone among countries with large economies that
have extremely low conversion rates. Other large countries with
low R&D spending to patenting rates include80:

77
These rates are based on reported R&D spending figures and patent application
counts. See NATIONAL SCIENCE BOARD, supra note 7, ch. 4, at tbl.4–5; United States
Patent Office, supra note 75.
78
Id.
79
Id.
80
See NATIONAL SCIENCE BOARD, supra note 7, ch. 4, at tbl.4–5 (R&D spending
amounts in PPP U.S. dollars); United States Patent Office, supra note 75 (U.S. patent
application counts).
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FIGURE 6
US Patent Applications Fiscal Year 2016 ‐‐
Additional Countries
R&D
Number
US Apps
Country Amount of Apps
per R&D
(Billion $) 2016
India
Russia
Brazil

50
38
38

7676
1102
968

153.52
29.00
25.47

Along with innovators in China, researchers in these countries
rarely seek compensation for advances in United States markets
via United States patents, measuring their efforts in relation to the
R&D spending to patenting conversion processes utilized by United States innovators. The conversion rates for R&D spending to
patenting for innovators in India was only about 24% of the rate
for United States innovators. The corresponding rates for researchers in Russia and Brazil were only about 4% of their United States
counterpart.
As reflected in the low patenting rates for many countries
spending large amounts on research and development activities,
many innovators in these countries are failing to pursue compensation for their advances through the sorts of United States patentmediated rewards sought by United States innovators. The reasons
for this gap—that is, for the missing patents corresponding to high
levels of research in many of these countries—are explored in subsection B below.
2. Indicators of Low Patenting Despite Substantial Country
Expertise
Several other indicators confirm the low patenting rates for
some countries with large innovation capabilities. One key factor
affecting research capabilities from country to country is expertise
in cutting edge science and technology. Differences across countries in numbers of recent doctoral degree recipients in science and
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engineering fields provide rough measures of the expertise differences. Countries with large numbers of recent degree recipients in
science and technology fields should have stronger research capabilities than countries with fewer such degree recipients.
Using recent PhD degrees as a research resource indicator produces further evidence of low patenting in countries that expertise
levels suggest should be major innovators. Taking into account only degrees in science and engineering fields, ratios of patent applications in the United States in 2016 to PhDs in 2014 vary substantially across countries. These ratios indicate the number of patent
applications each country would be predicted to produce if the
countries had equal numbers of recent PhD recipients in science
and engineering fields, all else being equal across the countries.
The following figure summarizes these variations for several of the
largest sources of United States patents (countries are listed here in
descending order of R&D spending)81:

81

The earned doctorate counts in this figure are extracted from NATIONAL SCIENCE
BOARD, supra note 7, at app. tbl. 2–37. The patent application counts per country are
extracted from U.S. Patent Office, supra note 75, at Table 9.
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FIGURE 7
US Patent Applications per 1000 PhDs
PhDs
2014
(1000s)

Number US Apps
of Apps per 1000
2016
PhDs

United States
China
Japan
Germany
South Korea
France
India
United Kingdom
Brazil
Russia (2013)
Taiwan
Italy
Canada
Australia
Spain

40
34
7
15
6
10
13
14
9
19
2
6
5
5
7

318701 8000.73
27935
819.14
91383 13552.28
33254 2273.78
41823 6933.52
13489 1345.80
7676
583.99
14824 1038.75
968
106.09
1102
56.98
20875 8393.65
5871
949.23
14328 2761.76
4013
824.87
1902
283.54

Total 15 Countries
Total All Sources

193
230

598144
650411

Country

3104.47
2827.87

As with the evidence drawn from R&D spending, there are at
least three levels of patenting apparent in this data. First, patenting
per PhD in the United States, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan was
similar, indicating that innovators sought about the same numbers
of patents per new PhD. Within this group, patents per new PhD
were notably higher for Japanese innovators than for innovators in
the other three countries. Whether the high figure for Japanese innovators stems from more aggressive patenting practices, fewer
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recent PhDs, or other factors affecting either patenting or PhD levels is not clear from this data.
Second, Germany and Canada had roughly similar amounts of
patents per PhD, but at levels much lower than that of the United
States. The rate for Germany, for example, was only about 28% of
the rate for United States innovators. Despite being below the
comparable rate for the United States, the rate for German innovators was higher than the rates for innovators in the other European
countries listed.
Third, China was again at a much lower level of patenting. The
rate of patenting per PhD graduate for Chinese innovators was only
about 10% of that for innovators from the United States. China’s
rate was comparable to those of several other technology sources
across the world, including (in descending order) France, the United Kingdom, Italy, Australia, and India. While this suggests that
recent PhDs and the expertise they add to technology development
may be producing the same levels of new United States patent applications from China as from the other countries listed in this paragraph, the low rates of patenting per PhD in all of these countries
compared to the United States is striking. The patenting rate per
new PhD was even lower for innovations from Russia.
While the results for some countries are a bit different (Germany seems to lag in patenting per R&D spending but performed
stronger in patenting per PhD, and the United Kingdom shows the
opposite pattern in these two analyses), this additional perspective
on patenting levels across countries suggests that innovators in a
number of countries are not seeking compensation for advances at
levels that country-specific expertise would predict. Put another
way, in countries like Germany and Canada, the levels of expertise
reflected in their recent PhD levels would suggest patenting rates
should be about four times higher were German and Canadian innovators to seek rewards via United States patents in the same
manner as United States innovators. In countries like China,
France, the United Kingdom, Italy, Australia, India, and Russia,
recent expertise additions (as reflected in counts of recent science
and engineering PhDs) indicate that innovators should be seeking
United States patents at about ten times their present rates to match
their United States counterparts.
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3. Indicators of Low Patenting Despite Substantial Academic
Outputs
Academic research article outputs provide yet another rough
measure of research capabilities across countries. Countries with
large numbers of published academic articles in science and engineering fields will generally reflect more active research programs
than countries with lower numbers of articles.82 The following figure summarizes patenting levels for several countries that are the
largest producers of academic articles (countries are listed here in
descending order of R&D spending)83:

82

See, e.g., NATIONAL SCIENCE BOARD, supra note 7, ch. 5, at 92 (“The output volume
of research, article counts, is one basic indicator of the degree to which different
performers contribute to the world’s production of research-based [science and
engineering] knowledge.”).
83
The article counts in this figure are extracted from NATIONAL SCIENCE BOARD, supra
note 7, at app. tbl. 5–27. The patent application counts per country are extracted from
United States Patent Office, supra note 75, tbl.9, at 174.
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FIGURE 8
US Patent Applications per Article

Country

Number Percent of
of S&E
All S&E Number
of Apps
Articles
Articles
2016
2016
2016

United States
China
Japan
Germany
South Korea
France
India
United Kingdom
Brazil
Russia (2013)
Taiwan
Italy
Canada
Australia
Spain

408985
426165
96536
103122
63063
69431
110320
97527
53607
59134
27385
69125
57356
51068
52821

17.82%
18.56%
4.21%
4.49%
2.75%
3.02%
4.81%
4.25%
2.34%
2.58%
1.19%
3.01%
2.50%
2.22%
2.30%

318701
27935
91383
33254
41823
13489
7676
14824
968
1102
20875
5871
14328
4013
1902

0.78
0.07
0.95
0.32
0.66
0.19
0.07
0.15
0.02
0.02
0.76
0.08
0.25
0.08
0.04

Total 15 Countries
Total All Sources

1798465 78.34%
2295608 100.00%

598144
650411

0.33
0.28

US Apps
per
Article

This data on patenting per academic article confirms two patterns seen in the previous analysis of patenting per R&D spending.
First, patenting levels (and associated attempts to obtain invention
rewards via United States patents) are roughly the same across a
top tier of countries including the United States, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan (as measured from patenting per academic article).
Second, patenting rates are much lower for innovators in China
and India as measured from patenting per academic article. Patenting rates per academic article were similarly low for Brazil, Russia,
Italy, and Spain. Innovators in these last six countries are produc-
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ing academic works at substantial rates (as indicated by their status
among the world’s top producers of published articles in science
and engineering fields), but innovators in these countries, including
technology giants China and India, appear to seek United States
patents at much lower rates per academic article.
For example, the rate of conversion of academic work to patented advances for Chinese innovators (treating the topic of each
article as a project potentially leading to an advance) is about 8%
of the rate for innovators in the United States. Put another way, if
academic work in China was converted to United States patent applications at the same rate as similar academic research in the
United States, we would expect Chinese patent filings in the United States (and corresponding attempts to gain rewards for innovation in the United States) to be over ten times the levels actually
observed. Chinese innovators, and their counterparts in India who
have similarly low patenting rates, are seeking United States patents for inventions at much lower rates than the academic research
in these countries would predict.
B. Possible Reasons for the Missing Patents
The low patenting rates seen for Chinese, Indian, Russian, Brazilian and some other innovators outside the United States may be
the result of at least four different factors: 1) lack of production of
patentable advances; 2) production of patentable advances with so
little commercial potential that patenting is not cost justified; 3)
production of valuable, patentable advances for which no United
States patents are desired or sought; or 4) production of valuable,
patentable advances for which United States patents are desired but
resources needed to gain and enforce such patents are lacking.
These possible reasons for the findings above are explored briefly
in this subsection. Further research will be needed to determine the
relative importance of these possible explanations (or if there are
yet additional reasons for the low patenting rates documented
here).
1. Research Spending Does Not Produce Patentable Advances
One possible reason why innovators in some countries seek far
fewer United States patents per R&D expenditure than innovators
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in the United States is that research spending in these countries
may produce fewer patentable advances per dollar spent. There are
two possible ways that this might result:
First, foreign research may not be as successful as in the United
States, leading to fewer inventions per R&D spending dollar. This
is another way of saying that foreign researchers may not spend
their research dollars as effectively or efficiently as their United
States counterparts. The reasons for this are impossible to determine from the present data.
Alternatively, foreign researchers may work as efficiently as
researchers in the United States—in the sense of inventions produced per research dollar spent—but create mostly inventions that
do not qualify for patents. This would reflect a different emphasis
in research than in the United States. If foreign research spending
mostly supports predictable research to produce obvious adjustments to prior technology designs and processes, then R&D spending will produce mostly unpatentable advances. A large fraction of
unpatentable advances, or even a mix of advances with a greater
fraction of unpatentable advances than in the United States, would
produce the sorts of low patenting rates described previously.
Whether a heavy emphasis on relatively mundane research explains the low patenting per research expenditures seen in the
above data will require more detailed study of the aims and results
of research in the various countries with low patenting rates.
2. Patentable Advances Produced Are Not Commercially
Important
Another possible reason behind the low patenting rates for innovators in some countries is that patentable advances are being
made at about the same invention per R&D spending rates as in the
United States, but the potentially patentable advances made in
these countries are perceived by their originators as having little
commercial value in the United States. Consequently, the cost of
obtaining and enforcing patents in the United States appears unjustified and no patents are sought.
This may reflect a difference in targeting of innovation, with
inventors in foreign settings producing new and non-obvious outlier advances much like their United States counterparts, but lacking
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a sense of commercial need. Foreign innovators, more than their
United States counterparts, may also lack resources to tailor raw
academic findings to consumer needs and thereby perfect patentable products that have commercial potential.
Such gaps in targeting invention efforts might result if many
potential inventors in a country were applying research spending to
produce pure academic findings without adjusting academic goals
to reflect the commercial potential of particular lines of research.
Similar divergence of research away from commercial targets
might also result from infrequent involvement of commercial entities in research in some foreign countries, causing a greater fraction of research targeting, and resulting research spending, to be
undertaken without aiming at the commercial potential of research
results.
3. Patentable Advances Produced but US Patents Are Not
Desired
Yet another possible basis for the low patenting rates for some
countries seen in the above findings is that innovators in these
countries, or the institutions that support them and that are the potential recipients of patent assignments based on innovations by the
foreign researchers, do not value and pursue United States patents
even for commercially important and potentially patentable advances. This failure to prioritize and pursue United States patents
might stem from gaps in information about: 1) the substantive requirements for obtaining a patent, 2) the availability of full patent
rights in the United States for foreign inventors, or 3) how to go
about getting and enforcing a United States patent. Alternatively, a
low priority placed on obtaining a United States patent may reflect
a substantive choice to emphasize values favoring free access to
intellectual discoveries and to reject intellectual property interests
like patents that may limit public access to certain advances.
Whatever the reason, the choice to forego a United States patent for a potentially patentable item with substantial value in the
United States simply sacrifices some of the compensation available
to inventors for useful advances. This failure is effectively a gift to
United States consumers. Even if an inventor gains a patent in his
or her home country, the failure to obtain a patent in the United
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States will forego the substantial patent-influenced rewards available from the world’s largest economy for advances that consumers
in the United States find useful.
More fundamentally, the failure to plan for patenting of a targeted advance means that United States patent rewards are not part
of the financing and resource allocation decisions underlying research endeavors. Where foreign research programs are targeted
and planned with careful attention to obtaining and enforcing, or
assigning away, patents on inventions valued in the United States,
the economic force of American market demand and commercialization of new advances can be placed behind foreign research efforts.
By contrast, if United States patenting is foregone, then patentbased financing support is sacrificed to the detriment of both foreign researchers and United States consumers. Parties making this
choice against United States patenting will not only forego support
for their research efforts; they may also find themselves disadvantaged when competing with other researchers who are counting on
United States patents for valuable advances and gaining associated
research support. Researchers who understand the potential of
United States patenting, who are sharp enough to create research
plans with patenting components, who gain increased funding and
resource allocations, and who complete more extensive and successful research accordingly are likely to prevail over less well
supported researchers working without reliance on United States
patents.
4. Resources are Lacking to Gain and Enforce Patents
Finally, low patenting rates per R&D dollar spent may result
because, although innovators in other countries are producing valuable, patentable advances at about the same rates as their United
States counterparts and desire United States patents; the overseas
innovators lack the resources needed to obtain and enforce related
United States patents. The funds needed to obtain patents and to
mount viable enforcement efforts may be essential to establish the
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value of patents in United States markets.84 Patents obtained without the expenditure of sufficient resources to produce carefully
drafted patents may lack meaningful value because they are drafted
in ways that fail to limit the most commercially valuable uses of
new advances. Even well-drafted patents may lack practical value
if a patent holder does not have resources to mount meaningful patent litigation against infringers. Absent the capability to support
such litigation, a patent holder will appear to be no more than a
paper tiger. Parties with commercial interests in a patented invention will simply use the invention as infringers without paying licensing fees or feeling threats of infringement injunctions or damage awards.
While the resources needed to gain and enforce patents in the
United States are not small,85 there are three reasons why the size
of these resources need not be a barrier to reliance on United States
patents for support of foreign innovation. First, patent enforcement
specialists (sometimes referred to as “nonpracticing entities” or,
less favorably, “patent trolls”86) are increasingly willing to acquire
84

Gene Quinn has estimated the typical costs for filing a United States utility patent
application for different types of inventions: 1) computer implemented method for
facilitating certain functionality via the Internet ($19,930 to $22,880), 2) consumer
electronics product ($14,080), and 3) mechanical tool ($12,080). He additionally
estimated post-filing costs of about $5,000 to $7,500 for USPTO fees and post-filing
attorneys’ services needed to gain an issued patent. See Gene Quinn, The Cost of
(Apr.
4,
2015),
Obtaining
a
Patent
in
the
US,
IPWATCHDOG
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2015/04/04/the-cost-of-obtaining-a-patent-in-theus/id=56485/ [https://perma.cc/9D4G-LZ8D]; see also Kiah Treece, How Much Does a
Patent Cost? Types, Factors & Ways to Save (June 26, 2018),
https://fitsmallbusiness.com/how-much-does-a-patent-cost/
[https://perma.cc/ZE55LT6F]. Substantial additional amounts will often need to be expended to enforce the
resulting patents. See Chris Neumeyer, Managing Costs of Patent Litigation,
IPWATCHDOG (Feb. 5, 2013), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2013/02/05/managing-costsof-patent-litigation/id=34808/ [https://perma.cc/6HBK-XXYM] (“According to the
American Intellectual Property Law Association, the cost of an average patent lawsuit,
where $1 million to $25 million is at risk, is $1.6 million through the end of discovery
and $2.8 million through final disposition.”).
85
See Quinn, supra note 84; see also Treece, supra note 84.
86
For a description of nonpracticing entities and their activities, see Federal Trade
Commission, Patent Assertion Entity Activity (Oct. 2016), https://www.ftc.gov
/system/files/documents/reports/patent-assertion-entity-activity-ftcstudy/p131203_patent_assertion_entity_activity_an_ftc_study_0.pdf
[https://perma.cc/N83Q-RAAX].
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United States patents covering inventions with value in this country, thereby creating an immediate market payoff for some patents
and shifting the patent enforcement burden to the acquiring entities. Patents may also be acquired by practicing companies (that is,
companies that will use or “practice” the patented invention in
some way), resulting in similar compensation to the former patent
owners. Second, a party obtaining a valuable patent can often grant
an exclusive license to the patent to another entity (often a large
company with production and marketing capabilities regarding
products incorporating the patented invention), thereby generating
licensing royalties and shifting the burden and cost of patent enforcement to the licensing party. Third, where a company both patents a new advance and begins to demonstrate the advance’s
commercial potential, the company may become an acquisition
target. If acquired, the compensation paid for the company’s stock
will be in part a payment for the patent rights that will transfer with
the company to the acquiring party. The result is another means of
patent-mediated compensation for the foreign innovator.
While these sorts of strategies will sometimes reduce patent enforcement costs, substantial resources may still be needed to gain
valuable United States patents and prove the value of related products. The costs of patenting efforts should be part of the planning
and project justification for particular research efforts. While some
upfront patent application costs will need to be built into budgets
and project justifications where parties intend to seek and rely on
United States patents, substantial commercial opportunities and
potential future revenues will also be added to planning considerations, with the result that the net value of many projects with
commercial and patenting potential may be materially increased by
considering United States patents as additional sources of research
funding.
C. A Few Counterexamples – Countries Riding the United States
Patent Wave
Researchers in a few countries already appear to be looking
regularly to United States patents as sources of compensation and
rewards for successful advances. The evidence of this lies in the
particularly high R&D spending to patenting conversion rates for a
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few countries. Countries with higher conversion rates than the rate
for innovators in the United States are ones where research dollars
are producing more patents (or at least more patent applications)
per dollar spent than in the United States. Put another way, assuming arguendo that the various patents gained have similar validity
and value per patent, countries with high R&D spending to patenting conversion rates have an especially high likelihood of having
research costs paid for and subsidized by United States consumers.
The following figure summarizes patenting rates for a few
countries with especially high conversion rates (the rate for the
United States is included at the top of the figure for comparison)87:
FIGURE 9
US Patent Applications per R&D Spending

Country
United States
Israel
Taiwan
South Korea
Japan

R&D
Number
US Apps
Amount of Apps
per R&D
(Billion $) 2016
497
13
33
74
170

318701
8251
20875
41823
91383

641.25
634.69
632.58
565.18
537.55

These technology producers, with conversion rates almost
equal to innovators in the United States, appear to know how to
translate research spending into valuable inventions and potential
United States rewards. Patents in the United States offer these foreign innovators substantial chances to recoup invention costs from
United States sales. Furthermore, a regular pattern of looking to
United States patents for future returns on invention costs means
that projects can be targeted, justified, and scaled in accordance
87

R&D spending amounts used in this figure were extracted from NATIONAL
SCIENCE BOARD, supra note 7, tbl.4–5, at 37. Note that the spending amounts
represent totals from 2015. The patent application counts per country are extracted from United States Patent Office, supra note 75, tbl.9, at 174.
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with the resources that United States markets and related patent
rewards imply. The result will be a greater linkage of invention
budgeting and targeting to the needs and potential rewards of United States consumers and businesses. The economic potential and
incentives associated with United States patents encourages overseas innovators to be as attuned to United States desires and economic support as similar innovators in this country.
CONCLUSION: STRATEGIES FOR SUBSIDIZING OVERSEAS
INVENTIONS
This article has described means to use patent rewards generated from United States patents to subsidize overseas innovation. It
has also described the apparent failure of innovators in many countries to take advantage of these subsidies. This section concludes
with a summary of means for overseas inventors, and entities that
support them, to better utilize the research support represented by
United States patents.
A. Major Steps to Ensure Technology Development Subsidies
1. Follow the Markets
The commercial value of a patented advance ultimately depends on the aggregate amount that parties will pay for access to
devices or processes incorporating the advance over alternative
devices or processes that perform the same functions without the
patented feature. This aggregate amount depends on two important
market characteristics: first, the number of parties interested in using the advance and, second, the amount each user will pay to gain
access to the advance. The value of a patented advance will also
depend on how much of the payment gained from a party for use
of the advance can be transformed into profit—that is, the amount
a user will pay for access to the patented advance, less the incremental production costs (if any) involved in including the patented
advance in products or services.
In light of these factors, patent-protected advances with the
greatest value are not those that rely on the most surprising or fundamentally new technology, but rather those advances that are dis-
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tinctively different enough to qualify for a patent and used very
widely such that patent-influenced product prices can be charged
for sales of the advances to numerous parties. Aggregate value
provided in the hands of users is the way to project the potential
value of advances and to target corresponding research efforts.
2. Consider Protections in Additional Countries as
Supplements to United States Patents
Carrying the principle of “follow the markets” one step further,
protections in countries outside the United States for advances by
foreign inventors can add to aggregate rewards and incentives. Patent protections should be sought in the United States plus additional foreign countries where patent-influenced sales in additional
countries will be likely to produce further profits and add to research subsidies from United States patents. This “United States
plus” strategy for patenting will justify different lists of targeted
countries for patenting different types of advances. Some considerations to address in picking countries for additional patent applications beyond applications in the United States include the following:
a) Size of Country Markets
The three market size factors mentioned above—number of invention users, access price, and profit per payment—may be difficult to estimate for particular countries, particularly in advance of
designing, making, and selling products incorporating the inventions in the countries. Unfortunately, patent targeting decisions will
need to be made at much earlier stages based on speculative information about relevant market sizes.
Given the high degree of uncertainty generally prevailing about
these factors influencing patent value, it may be wise to use economy size as a rough indicator of probable market size and patent
potential in particular countries. Generally, larger economies will
support more commercial transactions at higher price points than
smaller economies, meaning that adoptions of patented advances
(and perhaps the amounts parties will pay for access to the advances) should tend to increase with economy size.
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Economy size rather quickly narrows the list of desirable countries for patent targeting. A relatively small number of countries—
and corresponding patenting targets—conduct the bulk of commercial activity worldwide. The concentration of most world economic activity in a few countries implies that most of the patentmediated returns from commercial activities can be realized by focusing on patenting in those countries. The fifteen largest country
economies88 account for just almost 70% of world economic activities (measured on a PPP basis).89 Patenting strategies targeting
some or all of these fifteen economies will probably capture most
or all of the patent-influenced profits to be gained from commercially important advances.
The following figure breaks down the GDP figures for these
fifteen countries90:

88
See U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, Country Comparison: GDP (Purchasing
Power Parity) in THE WORLD FACTBOOK, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/theworld-factbook/rankorder/2001rank.html [https://perma.cc/GK5G-TKN3] (last visited
Sept. 5, 2018).
89
The top 15 economies account for a total of $88,595 billion in GDP versus about
$127000 billion GDP worldwide. See id. This means that about 88595 / 127000 = .6976
or 69.76% of worldwide GDP is produced in the top 15 economies.
90
The GDP values in this figure are stated in PPP US dollars. See id.
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FIGURE 10
World GDP 2017 (PPP US Dollars)

Country

GDP
Percent
Cumulative
Amount of World
Percent
(Billion $)
GDP

China
United States
India
Japan
Germany
Russia
Indonesia
Brazil
United Kingdom
France
Mexico
Italy
Turkey
South Korea
Spain

$23,160
$19,390
$9,459
$5,429
$4,171
$4,008
$3,243
$3,240
$2,914
$2,836
$2,458
$2,311
$2,173
$2,029
$1,774

Top 15 Countries
World

$88,595 69.76%
$127,000 100.00%

18.24%
15.27%
7.45%
4.27%
3.28%
3.16%
2.55%
2.55%
2.29%
2.23%
1.94%
1.82%
1.71%
1.60%
1.40%

18.24%
33.50%
40.95%
45.23%
48.51%
51.67%
54.22%
56.77%
59.07%
61.30%
63.23%
65.05%
66.77%
68.36%
69.76%

Not all of these 15 countries need be targeted for patenting. Indeed, even for these countries with some of the world’s largest
economies, the advantages of adding additional countries (as indicated by their percentages of worldwide GDP) may be small. For
example, adding patents in Spain to a patenting strategy may only
add about 1.4% to projected patent-influenced revenues, corresponding to the additional fraction of world GDP potentially controlled by adding these patents.
A party producing a broadly valuable advance and considering
which countries to target for international patenting can roughly
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estimate the fraction of the world’s commerce he or she will influence from any tentative list of countries chosen for patenting. The
fraction of patent-influenced profits potentially resulting from any
choice of countries will, at best, roughly correspond to the cumulative percent of world GDP in the set of countries chosen. For example, were a party to seek patents for an advance in the top five
countries listed in Figure 10, he or she would hold patent rights
over almost half of the world’s economy as measured from country
GDPs.
However, as explored more thoroughly in the next subsection,
weaknesses in substantive patent laws or gaps in patent enforcement may make patent controls in some of the listed countries limited in practical value. Practical limitations of patent enforcement
may justify downward adjustments in the patent profit estimates
that GDP figures would otherwise support. This may, in turn, support omitting some countries from patenting strategies.
b) Adjustments for Enforcement Effectiveness
Once tentative choices for patenting countries are made in light
of the market size criteria mentioned to this point, further adjustments may be desirable in light of the weakness of patent enforcement in particular countries. If it appears that patent rights are
weakly defined, poorly enforced, or even unavailable, the rights
will be of little practical value. Patent rights will fail to control
some or all of the sales and use of products in countries with weak
enforcement, making it wise to discount the apparent value of patent rights in these countries to reflect the uncontrolled sales and
uses. In some cases, this discounting may so reduce the projected
value of patent rights in a country as to warrant dropping the country from the list of patenting choices. If patent rights seem unlikely
to be enforced at all in a country, or if the costs of enforcement
seem unlikely to justify the very modest advantages gained from
enforcement, it will not be desirable to pursue patents in that country no matter how large its GDP.
However, before making a final choice to drop a country with a
large GDP from a patenting strategy, two additional factors should
be taken into account. First, the fact that patent protections are
presently weak does not necessarily mean that they will stay weak
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over the potential life of available patents. Even if patents appear
to be presently of little practical value, signs that patent rights are
being enforced with increasing regularity and impact may suggest
that having a patent in the country will be valuable over the life of
the patent. Even if a patent is only enforceable late in a patent
term, this will frequently be enough to realize most of the commercial value of a patented invention. Most of the sales of the invention, and attempts at infringing sales, will not occur early in the life
of a patent when the patented technology is still being transformed
into marketable products but rather late in the life of the patent
when sales of the invention have been heavily promoted and the
invention has gained substantial popular acceptance.91 If there is a
prospect that a patent gained today in a given country will have an
impact on this type of future marketing as the efforts to popularize
the patented invention mature, then doubts about present unenforceability should be overlooked and a patent pursued as a good
investment in future marketing success.
Second, even imperfectly enforceable rights may be of significant value in an important market. Thus, for example, even a partial patent enforcement effect in a large product market and manufacturing source such as China may have significant commercial
value even if many infringing uses of a patented item slip through
patent enforcement. The projected value of patent rights in a country—leaving aside the possibilities of future rights enforcement
just addressed—should equal the projected value of patent rights in
91

While the tendency of most patented items to generate increased profits at the end of
a patent term is applicable across many types of inventions, it is particularly significant
for pharmaceutical advances. As noted by Neel U. Sukhatme and Judd N. L. Cramer:
“[P]harmaceuticals—due to the long regulatory approval process before the Food and
Drug Administration, a drug may not even be salable for years into its patent term.
Indeed, much of the profit for the drug might be obtained in the very last years of its
patent term.” Neel U. Sukhatme & Judd N. L. Cramer, Who Cares About Patent Term?
Cross-Industry Differences in Term Sensitivity 5 (Sept. 24, 2014), https://
scholar.princeton.edu/sites/default/files/sukhatme/files/sukhatme_who_cares_about_pate
nt_term_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/B398-L2RN]. Holders of patents on other types of
inventions also anticipate gaining significant fractions of their patent-influenced profits
late in the term of their patents. For example, a study of patent holder behaviors found
that holders of software and computer patents also tended to be particularly interested in
the terms of their patents, apparently because the last portions of these terms were
expected to be sources of significant profits. See id. at 2, 45.
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the country if fully enforced, discounted by the likelihood of enforcement. This discounted value may still be very high if the full
enforcement value is high, justifying patent protection in that country.
3. Patent in Further Countries to Protect Manufacturing
Sources
One exception to the “follow the markets” principle for targeting patenting countries is a complementary strategy that emphasizes the potential for manufacturing in various countries. This further
strategy may justify adding countries as patenting targets based on
advantages gained from controlling manufacturing in the additional countries. Patenting in these additional countries may be warranted as an indirect means to control patented advances in high
GDP countries.
Patent controls aimed at product manufacturing can supplement controls on the manufactured products where they are sold
and used. Where products are made in Country A but sold and
used in Country B, two different countries’ patent laws will need to
be used to gain full control over both manufacturing (governed by
Country A’s laws) and sales and use (governed by Country B’s
laws).92
If a patent holder was confident in controlling and obtaining
patent-influenced sales or licensing revenues from all sales and
uses of a patented product in the countries where sales or uses occur, then no further controls over product manufacturing would be
needed to realize the full patent rewards for the product. However,
patent controls over product manufacturing may have several ad-

92

The analysis of multi-country patent enforcement strategies for patents covering
manufactured products is different than the analysis for patents aimed at manufacturing
itself rather than the products being manufactured. Patents applicable to manufacturing
equipment or techniques will generally need to be enforced in countries where the
manufacturing occurs since the sale of unpatented products resulting from the patented
advances will not be controlled by the relevant patents. Applying manufacturing-related
patents in the countries where manufacturing occurs is just a special case of the general
“follow the markets” principle for patent targeting and enforcement. The primary—
indeed, perhaps the exclusive—markets for patented manufacturing equipment and
techniques are in countries where the associated manufacturing takes place.
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vantages over a patent enforcement strategy relying exclusively, or
even predominantly, on controls over product sales or use.
First, patent enforcement targeting manufacturing may be superior to enforcement emphasizing product sales or use because of
differences in the substantive patent laws or patent enforcement
effectiveness across different countries. If manufacturing occurs in
Country A with strong patent protections, but product sales and use
will primarily occur in Country B with weak protections (or will
occur in numerous countries with uncertain levels of patent protections), a focus on enforcement against unauthorized manufacturing
in Country A may make sense.
Second, focusing patent enforcement on manufacturing may
have administrative advantages over enforcement aimed at product
sales and use. Product manufacturing is typically concentrated in a
few parties and locations, while the latter may be scattered across
the world. Patent controls over manufacturing may be a convenient
way to charge one party (a manufacturer licensing the right to
make a patented item) for the production of many product units or
to prevent such production if a party will not pay. By limiting
manufacturing of a patented item through close policing of authorized manufacturers, a patent holder can control the downstream
commercialization of many units of a patented invention through a
few administrative contacts with authorized manufacturers.
Third, patent enforcement actions against unauthorized manufacturers can avoid the need for suits against product consumers
that may sour later product sales to the consumers. Where unauthorized manufacturers are producing high volumes of knockoff
patented items and selling these to consumers, it may be far more
palatable for a patent holder to sue the manufacturer of the
knockoffs for infringement—and thereby cut off unauthorized
sources of patented items—than to sue consumers who have purchased or used unauthorized versions of the patented product.
These consumers will hopefully be future customers for authorized
versions of the same products. To maintain their goodwill, direct
patent enforcement suits against these consumers, while technically available, will be unwise in the context of future product marketing.
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For all of these reasons, parties may wish to add countries to
their patenting strategies because the countries are potential manufacturing locations (assuming that the countries are not already targeted for patenting based on their market sizes). Additional country selections based on manufacturing alone will be technologyspecific (based on the varying manufacturing costs and locational
advantages associated with different countries and types of technologies). These factors may also evolve significantly over time
(based on changes in factors such as shifting labor costs and increasing uses of robotic processes altering manufacturing costs in
different countries over time). Unfortunately, countries with favorable manufacturing sites for a given type of patented product will
need to be identified and targeted for patenting based on estimation
of manufacturing features over the entire term of the patents at
stake (a period of 20 years from patent application in the United
States93). Information uncertainties governing these costs suggest
that gaining patent protection in all likely manufacturing countries
may be either expensive (because a broadly inclusive approach to
manufacturing likelihood and associated patenting is pursued) or
under-inclusive (because estimates focusing on patenting in present manufacturing centers will not include other countries that
become important later). Nonetheless, it will typically be important
to consider adjusting initially chosen lists of countries for patent
protection to add countries with any large manufacturing sites
(both present and projected) that are not already included due to
market size considerations.
4. Protect Like an Affluent, Efficient Producer and Marketer
As a last overarching consideration, a new technology producer—particularly a party in a developing country who may be resource-constrained—should seek patent protections for a new advance that covers as much as possible of the full commercial value
of the new advance, as this full value will be perceived and realized by more affluent and efficient product producers and marketers. The value of patents always lies in the future completion of
commercial processes influenced by the patents. To envision the
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full value of patents, and to both produce the most valuable inventions and obtain the best patents on them, innovators should project
the future use of their innovations as protected by patents held by
commercial entities that can make the best use of the patents. Innovators, however small in resources and wherever located, should
project the desirability of patents as if they were affluent commercial parties with substantial expertise and resources sufficient to
realize patent-influenced profits in United States markets and other
profitable foreign markets.
These projections are not mere fantasies; rather, in most cases
of fully realized inventions with broad public utility and large
commercial value, relatively simple legal measures can entice efficient producers and marketers to carry out the full commercialization of valuable patented products. The innovators who have generated the products, and who have the appropriate patents to ensure
that only they can transfer rights to produce and sell the products,
will be in position to gain compensation for their patent rights that
reflect the commercial value seen and realizable by efficient product producers and marketers.
This means that patent targeting decisions should be made as
much as possible without limitations due to a technology producer’s present resource constraints regarding the production and marketing of products incorporating a patented advance. A technology
producer should “think big” in assessing the commercial potential
of a new advance, at least in assessing where commercial potential
may lie in the future and where patent protections should be
sought. The key in setting the proper perspective is that the technology originator will often not be the technology commercializer.
The latter may have much greater resources than the technology
originator (or may, in fact, be multiple parties who have much
greater resources and market expertise in the aggregate).
The perspective of a resource rich commercializer may be
much more international than that of a small-scale technology originator seeking to just produce a viable product for marketing in just
the originator’s own country. The total international value of a new
technology properly protected with appropriate patents and other
IP protections can be realized by combinations of licensees and
assignees rather than by just the original technology producer.
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However, if a technology originator only seeks limited patent
protections (and major international markets are left out of the
countries targeted for patenting), there will be little or no IP rights
in key countries to transfer in license or assignment transactions.
Parties will have little reason to devote the types of new product
manufacturing and introduction resources that may be needed to
popularize a new advance in major markets. For example, even if
patent protections are obtained in one important market—say in
the United States—the worldwide value of an invention may be
sacrificed. The commercial value of the invention in other key
markets such as Europe and Japan will be lost to the innovator by
failing to seek patents there since the patented product can be made
and sold freely in these areas by any party in the absence of patent
protections.
A technology originator determining where to patent a new invention should evaluate the full range of potential invention rewards available through patent protections from the perspective of
a well-healed large company that is operative in the same field and
that can efficiently and effectively produce and market goods to
meet the full worldwide demand for the patented advance. This
sort of company will be the logical target for licensing or transfer
of the resulting patents. The perspective of such a resource-rich
party will determine the potential international value of the patent
protections on a new advance because this perspective will determine the value of licenses or assignments of the patents at stake.
This full value can be realized by an inventor, provided that the
appropriate set of multi-country patent protections needed to support international commercialization is obtained and then offered
to one or more companies capable of carrying out the commercialization.
Given a patent-defined opportunity to gain exclusive commercial rights in major markets, a large company (as a potential licensee or assignee) is most likely to offer the innovator his or her best
possible compensation for patent rights governing a new technology. Absent some or all of the optimal patents (with optimality seen
from the perspective of the large company), the large company’s
offer will be reduced by the value of the missing patents. Hence,
while a technology originator may be resource constrained and un-
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able to develop the full international commercial value of a new
technology in all of the markets where the technology has significant projected worth, the originator should make patent targeting
decisions as if the resources for broad scale commercialization are
present. If proper patent protections are sought, these resources
will be brought to the commercialization process by other parties
licensing or receiving assignments of the relevant patents. The full
worldwide value of the technology originator’s new advance can
be realized in this way, provided the originator has targeted and
obtained the patents needed in the full range of major commercial
markets.
Finally, at the outset of projects, parties developing new technologies should emphasize the full range of commercial rewards
for the products (as protected by appropriate patents) when seeking
research funding and other support. This approach uses projected
patenting and commercialization across multiple countries as key
features of estimating the value of commercially-oriented research
projects. The same approach will be useful in estimating the value
of commercial components of projects with major commercial implications even if further abstract knowledge is also targeted (as
will be true in academic projects with commercial significance).
The largest future value of many technical advances will be in the
United States and in other countries with large economies. Researchers will be able to present the best possible picture of the
commercial potential for specific projects in two ways: first, by
emphasizing that they are targeting the widespread needs of parties
in those countries and second, by protecting the commercial value
of new advances through corresponding patenting. They will therefore be likely to gain the largest investments and other support for
additional resource-intensive innovation.
B. Beneficiaries of International Influence from United States
Patents
Even without relying on patent-mediated research rewards
from additional countries, foreign innovators stand to benefit from
greater attention to patents in the United States for the reasons described in this article. Inventors in some countries—particularly in
Israel, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan—are already attuned to the
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advantages of targeting patent-enhanced profits in the United
States to increase research support and associated business profits.
Innovators elsewhere will be well-served to follow their example
and file for many more United States patents regarding their research results.
Expanded reliance on United States patents by innovators and
research organizations worldwide will not only assist foreign research projects but will benefit innovation developers and consumers in all countries. Patent-induced investment in research, regardless of where the research is conducted, is likely to produce more
research projects and more results. It will achieve this both by
bringing more R&D research dollars into play and by shifting
some existing funding from mundane, predictable lines of research
to support instead the more innovative, non-obvious research likely
to produce outlier advances that will qualify for patents.
The new outlier inventions added to technology knowledge in
this manner are benefits that simply would not be gained without
the heightened and redirected research financing and efforts encouraged by patents. Technology developers everywhere stand to
benefit greatly from these incremental efforts. They will gain new
knowledge about outlier advances as an enhanced base for further
rounds of innovation. They can use this expanded knowledge to
produce additional advances, often along fresh lines of design inspired and made possible by the root outlier advances enabled
through patent subsidies.
Perhaps more importantly, technology users worldwide will
benefit from more numerous patent-induced research projects because these projects will be likely to produce more useful devices,
materials, and processes. Patent incentives will encourage new design approaches to solve both old and new problems, resulting in
advances with design elements that reflect significant departures
from earlier technological tools. While not all patent-induced projects will succeed—just as not all batters get a hit at every at bat—
patent influence will encourage innovators to “think big” and try to
depart from prevailing technology wisdom to produce more outlier
advances that can qualify for patents. By increasing the numbers of
advances produced and shifting projects towards greater emphasis
on outlier approaches, United States patent incentives can create
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innovation forces around the world that promote new originality in
technology development and new lines of valuable technology
tools.

